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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

Статья "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership" опубликована в International Journal of Game Theory (2013), Volume 42, Issue 3, pp. 673–694.

Авторы: Шломо Вебер , Michel Le Breton, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Alexei Savvateev

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.