



Centre for Economic  
and Financial Research  
at New Economic School

Nº 29

*July 2007*



# Labor Market Flows in Transition

Irina Denisova, Markus Eller,  
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

*CEFIR Policy Paper series*

# LABOR MARKET FLOWS IN TRANSITION

Irina Denisova, Markus Eller, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya\*  
CEFIR

July 4, 2007

## Abstract

Based on the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank, we examine labor market transformation during transition from planned to market economies in 29 countries in post-communist Europe and Central Asia. The results indicate that the transition shock of the early 90s had a substantial effect on employment and labor market trajectories at the microeconomic level. The main results can be summarized as follows. Labor market participation decreases sharply in most countries and recovers only by 2001 onwards. The self-employment sector grows gradually as transition progresses. There is a large substitution of state for private sector employment throughout the transition. State sector employment is hit much stronger by the transition shock and private sector employment is the preferred option when people return to work for wages after a period of nonemployment or enter work force after completing their education. High-skill employment is more shock-resistant than low- or medium-skill employment; there is no evidence of an upward or downward occupational mobility. With regard to both timing and intensity of the transition shock, labor markets have been affected differentially in different regions. Even though cross-country heterogeneity of the labor market transitions is very large, some typology is observed.

---

\*We are grateful to EBRD for financial support. Markus Eller also thanks the Austrian Research Association (Oesterreichische Forschungsgemeinschaft) for financial support. All authors are from the Center for Economic and Financial Research in Moscow ([www.cefir.ru](http://www.cefir.ru)). Please send correspondence to Ekaterina Zhuravskaya at the Center for Economic and Financial Research, 47 Nakhimovsky prospect, 117418 Moscow, Russia, Email: [EZhuravskaya@cefir.ru](mailto:EZhuravskaya@cefir.ru), Phone: (7495) 1055002, Fax: (7495) 1055003

# 1 Introduction

Transition from central planning to market arguably is one of the most important events in modern economic history. Transition has drastically changed lives of more than a billion people. Yet, there has been a void in microeconomic data in many transition countries. Particularly, there has been little information on labor market transitions. In this report, we examine labor market transition experiences based on microeconomic data from "Life in Transition Survey" (LiTS), which was jointly conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank in 2006 (for details see EBRD, 2007)<sup>1</sup> LiTS consists of 29,000 interviews in 29 transition countries of Eastern Europe, CIS, and Central Asia.<sup>2</sup> In each country a random sample of a 1,000 individuals was selected for face-to-face interviews. LiTS survey contains retrospective questions on professional trajectories of people documenting their employment histories from 1989 to 2006. It reveals for each year whether the respondent worked for wages, was self-employed, or was not employed. In addition, for those employed it is known in each year whether they were employed in the state or private sector and whether they worked in an occupation requiring high skills or in an occupation requiring low or medium skills. This report documents how labor market status of people was affected by the transition.

# 2 Data description

We have depicted labor market flows and stocks for the whole region and for each of the 29 transition countries from 1990 to 2006. Particularly, we calculated (i) conditional probabilities for a respondent to move from one year to the other between the different labor market states conditional on the state the person is in (these variables represent gross flows between different labor market states), (ii) net flows between each of the states (as percentage of within-working-age respondents), and (iii) the stock of persons belonging to each of the states (as percentage of within-working-age respondents). Labor market states as presented in the figures are: (1) work for wages, (1a) work for wages in the state sector (state sector employment), (1b) work for wages in the private sector (private sector employment), (1c) work for wages in an occupation requiring high skills (high-skill employment), (1d) work for wages in an occupation not requiring high skills (low- or medium-skill employment), (2) self-employment, (3) nonemployment. To assess whether the flow trajectories changed significantly, we highlight the standard errors for each point in time. The first set of respective figures presents both the net flow trajectories and the stocks (see Appendix 1), while the second set of figures illustrates the conditional probabilities to move between different

---

<sup>1</sup>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2007), Life in Transition, A Survey of People's Experiences and Attitudes, May 2007.

<sup>2</sup>The list of countries is as follows: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. None of the generalizations in this report depend on inclusion/exclusion of Turkey—which is not a transition country—in/out of the sample.

labor market states (see Appendix 2).

There are gender- and age-specific differences in the sample. Female respondents have changed their labor market status much less frequently than male respondents. Moreover, there is a bias in the sample of some countries towards elderly and female respondents. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, we restrict the sample for each year to male within-working-age respondents (with an age between 18 and 60). Further we applied a weighting scheme that ensures that the male population as a whole is represented, taking into account the age distribution of the male population in each country (see EBRD, 2007: 6). This exercise has delivered a number of conclusive findings that are summarized in the subsequent sections.

### 3 Main findings for the whole sample

In this section, we describe the overall pattern of labor market transitions from the whole sample. In the next section, we highlight the most important differences and similarities across specific countries.

#### 3.1 General labor market stocks and flows

First, we describe the transitions between three states: work for wages, self-employment, and non-employment without making a distinction between working for state vs. private sector or changes in occupation levels. In the subsequent sub-sections, we focus on transitions between state and private sector wages and on occupational mobility.

*Stocks:*

In 1989 about 69% of the male within-working-age respondents worked for wages, 5% were self-employed, and the remaining 26% were not employed. The share of work-for-wages respondents decreases steadily until the end of the 90s to 52%; it remains constant until 2004, and tends to increase afterwards to 56% in 2006. The share of not employed respondents, on the other hand, moves reversely. It increases to 35% until the end of the 90s and decreases to 29% in 2006. The share of self-employed respondents increases over the whole time horizon steadily to considerable 15% in 2006. Most notably, we observe the U-shaped pattern for work for wages and the hump-shaped pattern for nonemployment reflect the general macroeconomic transition path.

*Flows:*

The flows between work for wages and nonemployment are very instructive. Until 1994 the conditional probability to move from nonemployment to work for wages decreases sharply, then it varies only slightly, and from 2001 onwards it tends to increase strongly. The conditional probability to move from work for wages to nonemployment, on the other hand, increases until 1992 and decreases afterwards. On a net base, there are more flows from work for wages to nonemployment until 1994, while from 1995 onwards the flows from nonemployment

to work for wages dominate.<sup>3</sup> Thus, until the mid of 90s the negative impact of the transition shock is reflected by these movements. A substantial recovery seems to start only from 2001 onwards.

Self-employment has a positive net balance with both work for wages and nonemployment. The steady increase of the conditional probability to move from work for wages to self-employment is interrupted by a substantial decline in 1997. At the end of the observation period both the conditional probabilities to move from work for wages to self-employment and from self-employment to work for wages are strongly increasing. There are more flows from work for wages to self-employment than the other way around, but this difference decreases over time.

The conditional probability to move from nonemployment to self-employment is steadily increasing over time, with exceptionally strong movements in 2000 and 2006. The conditional probability to move from self-employment to nonemployment, on the other hand, follows a U-shaped pattern: it decreases strongly until 1993, remains at a constant level until 2005, and only in 2006 there is a strong exceptional increase. Except for 1990, the flows from nonemployment to self-employment outweigh always the flows from self-employment to nonemployment. Altogether, this reflects the over time increase in importance of self-employment as possible option for people.

It is striking how gradual transition has been: conditional on working for wages in a given year, it is most likely that the respondent remains in work for wages group in the subsequent year (the conditional probability ranges from 93% to 95.5%), while the probability for becoming not employed ranges from 2.5% to 5% and the probability for becoming self-employed ranges between 0.7% in 1990 and 2% in 2006. Self-employment and nonemployment have a less persistent structure than work for wages. Once the respondent is self-employed in a given year, the probability to remain self-employed in the following year is between 87% and 96%; the probability to get a work for wages or to become not employed ranges between 1.5% and 6%. Nonemployment loses some of its persistence especially after 2001. While the conditional probability to remain not employed in most years is about 89% before 2001, it decreases to nearly 80% in 2006. This reflects the considerable recovery in most transition countries in 2001.

### **3.2 Labor market stocks and flows, distinguishing between state and private sector employment**

By far the largest effect of transition on labor market status of people is within the group of those who worked for wages: there has been a massive reallocation of jobs from state to private sector.

*Stocks:*

In 1989 about 54% of the male within-working-age respondents worked for wages in a firm that was owned by the state (henceforth, state sector employment); the respective share of respondents working for wages in a private-

---

<sup>3</sup>Part of this effect may be attributed to the entry of young people into the labor market due to the structure of our sample.

or foreign-owned firm (henceforth, private sector employment) amounted to 15%. State sector employment is steadily decreasing over time and private sector employment is steadily increasing. In 2001 private sector employment exceeded for the first time the state sector employment. At the end of the observation period (2006), the share of state sector employment reached 22% and the share of private sector employment increased to nearly 34%. Thus, state sector employment is substituted by private sector employment, reflecting ample privatization associated with the transition from planned to market economy.

*Flows:*

The substitution of state by private sector employment is also indicated by the flows between these two categories. Especially at the beginning of transition (until 1992) there is a strong increase in the conditional probability to move from state to private sector employment; afterwards it remains at a more or less constant level. On a net base, there are always more flows from state to private sector employment than the other way around, but this relation weakens over time. Thus, substitution takes place especially at the beginning of transition and slows down as transition progresses.

The distinction between state and private sector employment turns out to be very important for the flows vis-à-vis nonemployment. The two groups—employees in state and in private sector—behave very differently in this respect. While there are always more flows from nonemployment to private sector employment (this relation actually strengthens over time), state sector employment has a negative net balance with nonemployment for nearly all the years (except for 2001, 2005, and 2006). This is basically due to the fact that the conditional probability to switch from nonemployment to state sector employment decreases strongly until 2002 (and increases only from 2002 onwards), while the conditional probability to switch from nonemployment to private sector employment is always increasing (very strongly so from 2003 onwards). These movements indicate that private sector employment is the preferred option to enter the labor force or return to work for wages after a nonemployment experience. At the same time, state sector employment seems to be affected stronger by the transition shock than private sector employment.

Self-employment exhibits a positive net balance with both state and private sector employment for most of the years, but the pattern evolves differently. While the positive net flows from state sector employment to self-employment are steadily decreasing after 1994, the positive net flows from private sector employment to self-employment are strengthening from 2003 onwards. This is accompanied by the fact that after 2004 the conditional probability to move from private sector employment to self-employment increases strongly; at the same time the conditional probability to remain employed in the private sector is reduced significantly. Thus, it is striking that especially at the end of the observation period respondents working for wages in the private sector switch more intensively into self-employment than ever before. At the same time, this is not the case for the state sector

employment.

### 3.3 Labor market stocks and flows, distinguishing between high-skill and low- or medium-skill employment

*Stocks:*

The share of male within-working-age respondents that work for wages in an occupation requiring high skills (henceforth high-skill employment) does not substantially change during the observation period. It ranges continuously between 10% and 12%. The respective share for respondents that work for wages in an occupation not requiring high skills (henceforth low- or medium-skill employment) follows exactly the same U-shaped pattern as for total work for wages. This indicates that high-skill employment has been affected by the transition shock to a lesser extent than employment in lower occupations.

*Flows:*

The movements between high-skill employment and low- or medium-skill employment do not exhibit a clear-cut pattern, but in most of the years there are more flows from low- or medium-skill employment to high-skill employment than the other way around. Neither a downward nor an upward trend in occupational mobility can be observed.

Concerning the flows vis-à-vis nonemployment, high-skill employment and low- or medium-skill employment do not differ a lot. Both categories exhibit a similar pattern for the conditional probabilities, similarly to those for total work for wages. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the flows from nonemployment to high-skill employment outweigh the reverse flows in most of the years (except for 1992 and 1993). After 1997—when also low- or medium-skill employment starts to have a clear positive net balance with regard to nonemployment—this dominance is still stronger pronounced for high-skill employment. Again, this is an indication for high-skill employment being more shock-resistant than low- or medium-skill employment.

The flows with respect to self-employment exhibit the same pattern for both categories as for total work for wages. Most notably, the positive net balance of self-employment is stronger pronounced for low- or medium-skill employment than for high-skill employment.

## 4 Country-specific patterns and typology

This section highlights the most striking differences across countries for the labor market stocks and flows. In Tables 1-3 we list the starting and ending shares for the different labor market states and rank them across countries. This comparison indicates a remarkable cross-country heterogeneity. Our discussion in this section

describes this heterogeneity and groups countries with common patterns. More detailed, country-by-country description of the labor market flows are presented in Section below.

There is a distinct group of countries whose labor market was hit very strongly by the transition shock (in terms of strong initial flows from work for wages to either nonemployment or self-employment). It includes Albania (the nonemployment share more than doubles from 1989 to 1993), Czech Republic (the decrease of the work-for-wages stock translates immediately into an increase of self-employment), Georgia (strong flows to nonemployment until 1994), Moldova (strong flows to nonemployment after 1992 until 1998), Mongolia (strong flows to both nonemployment and self-employment until 1995), and Poland (strong flows to nonemployment until 1995).

Another distinct group of countries is the one in which there was practically no transition effect on non-employment. Most notably, this was the case in the core of the CIS region (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), but also in Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Having a closer look on what happened in these countries with respect to state and private sector employment, one can see that transition has not really led to a clear increase of the nonemployment share, but state sector employment has strongly been substituted by private sector employment. Only in Belarus this substitution effect is not that pronounced.

Having said that the core of the CIS region does not exhibit a clear transition impact on nonemployment, it is remarkable that the periphery of the CIS region (in particular Central Asia and Moldova) forms a separate group of countries, where the transition shock starts to hit the labor market later than in all the other countries. Considerable outflows from work for wages to nonemployment (in some cases also to self-employment) start in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan only after 1993, in Uzbekistan after 1994, in Tajikistan after 1991, and in Moldova after 1992. As a second difference to Russia and Ukraine, it is also remarkable that in this group of countries (except for Kazakhstan) one cannot observe a clear substitution of state by private sector employment. Note that this holds also for the South Caucasus countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, for Mongolia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a further indication for the impact of transition we check when the various countries substantially recovered from the transition shock. In this respect we are focusing on the year from which on flows from nonemployment to work for wages always clearly dominate. Here we can again highlight two different groups of countries. On the one hand, there are countries that need considerable time to cope with the transition shock, i.e. there is only a late recovery at the end of the observation period (from 2004 onwards). This holds for the South Caucasus countries, former Yugoslavian countries (except for Serbia, where no clear recovery can be detected), and also for Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania. On the other hand, there is also a group of countries that went through two waves of restructuring, whereby the first recovery was not sustainable; flows from work for wages to

nonemployment dominated for a second time around 2000. This is the case in Estonia, Hungary, and Poland, but also in Kyrgyzstan.

In terms of the timing of transition events throughout the region, countries differ also with respect to the decomposition of state and private sector employment. We can focus on the year when the share of private sector employment exceeds the share of state sector employment for the first time. Recall that for the whole sample this is the case in 2001. In this respect, the Baltic countries as well as the Czech Republic and Hungary are the “early risers.” They start already with a relatively high share of private sector employment (see Table 2), continuously replace state with private sector employment, and reach a larger share for private sector employment already in the mid of the 90s. Conversely, there is a group of “latecomers,” where private sector employment exceeds the share of state sector employment for the first time only at the end of the observation period. This is the case in Armenia (2004), Bosnia (2004), FYR Macedonia (2003), Montenegro (2006), Serbia (2004), and Ukraine (2003).

While we stated for the whole sample that there are always more flows from nonemployment to private sector employment than the other way around, this does not hold for each and every country in the region. We can observe that private sector employment loses on a net base to nonemployment in the South Caucasus countries, Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Moldova. This is especially pronounced during the restructuring period after the transition shock. On the other hand (and again conversely to the whole sample), we can also observe that state sector employment gains on a net base from nonemployment for several years in most of the CIS countries, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Mongolia.

Finally, let us emphasize a few results for specific regions and countries, where very particular for these places episodes got reflected in the labor market transitions. As already indicated by the before presented country-specific results, the South Caucasus countries form a region that was hit the hardest by the transition shock. In all the three countries the nonemployment share lies above the work-for-wages share in most of the years. This is not observed in other countries. Georgia is the only country where the work-for-wages share lies for a few years even below the self-employment share. The conditional probabilities to move from work for wages to nonemployment are initially very high in this region and there is, if any, only a late recovery from the transition shock. As already mentioned, there is no clear substitution of state by private sector employment in this region. Beyond it, the South Caucasus is the only region where a considerable decline of high-skill employment can be observed over time. But it is also noteworthy that in Georgia—mostly driven by strong inflows from nonemployment at the end of the observation period—the self-employment stock reaches with 28% in 2006 one of the highest shares throughout the region (see Table 1).

Another particular region is former Yugoslavia, where one would expect a strong impact of the war at the beginning of the 90s. In fact, this can only be observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while in Croatia the impact

of the Croatian War of Independence (1990-1995) cannot really be disentangled from the general transition shock by simply inspecting our labor market flow data. The labor market flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, are strongly affected by the Bosnian War 1992-1995. The nonemployment share increases from 50% in 1991 to a maximum of 75% in 1993 (2006: 35%), while the work-for-wages share decreases from 49% in 1991 to a minimum of 24% in 1993 (2006: 53%). Self-employment tends to increase considerably only from 1996 onwards. Although the war effect apparently aggravated the general transition shock, Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to consolidate its net balance of work for wages vis-à-vis nonemployment rather quickly. From 1995 onwards there are always more flows from nonemployment to work for wages than the other way around. This could also reflect a high demand for workers needed for reconstruction after the war. As in the South Caucasus region, high-skill employment reduces also in Bosnia-Herzegovina considerably during the period of war.

## 5 Conclusion from observing the overall patterns

The examination of the micro-level survey data delivered meaningful insights to labor market flows during transition from plan to market in 29 countries in Emerging Europe and Central Asia. The initial transition shock in the early 90s had a substantial effect on the labor market. The region recovered from this shock only from 2001 onwards. Transition gave rise to self-employment, which has been growing stronger as time progressed. There also has been a remarkable substitution of state by private sector employment. A lot of reallocation from state to private sector employment took place through a (often substantial) period of non-employment. Our distinction between different skill-types of employment indicated that high-skill employment was more shock-resistant than low- or medium-skill employment. Although flows from low- or medium skill employment to high-skill employment dominate flows in the opposite direction, there is no evidence for a massive upwards occupational mobility.

With regard to both timing and intensity of the transition shock, labor markets have been affected differently throughout the region. We emphasize a clear cross-country heterogeneity of the results: particularly, one can distinguish between countries with a strong initial impact of the transition shock, countries where the transition effect can only be detected with regard to state-private substitution (especially the core of the CIS region), countries with a relatively late start of the transition shock (especially the periphery of the CIS region), countries that tend to recover from the transition shock only at the end of the observation period, countries that went through two waves of restructuring, countries where private sector employment starts to dominate relatively early (especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states), and countries whose labor markets were hit extraordinarily strong (South Caucasus countries and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Bosnian War).

## 6 Labor market flows in specific countries

### 6.1 Albania

At the beginning of the 90ies, there is a strong negative impact of the transition shock on work for wages (decreases from 78% in 1989 to about 40% from 1993 onwards). At the same time, the nonemployment share more than doubles (from 21% in 1989 to 47% in 1993). Self-employment is steadily increasing from nearly 0% in 1989 to about 27% until 2005, what is an extraordinary high share as compared with other countries.

Self-employment turns out to be the most persistent labor market status in Albania. The conditional probability to remain self-employed ranges for most of the years between 95% and 99%. The conditional probability to continue with work for wages is only about 80% at the beginning (because of the strong outflow to nonemployment during this period), but stabilizes around 95% as transition progresses.

### 6.2 Armenia

For Armenia it is remarkable that the nonemployment share lies always above the work-for-wages share. Compared to the whole sample, Armenia needs more time to cope with the transition shock. This is indicated by the fact that work for wages has a clear positive net balance with nonemployment only from 2001 onwards.

Self-employment does not always have a positive net balance vis-a-vis nonemployment and work for wages. Contrary to the whole sample, self-employment in Armenia is very persistent at the beginning of transition (only small conditional probability to move to nonemployment, practically no outflow to work for wages), but loses this persistence especially at the end of the observation period (the self-employment share reduces strongly from 12% in 2005 to 7% in 2006, mostly induced by outflows to nonemployment).

### 6.3 Azerbaijan

The nonemployment share lies above the work-for-wages share, but only from 1995 onwards. Azerbaijan needs even more time than Armenia to consolidate its net balance of work for wages vis-a-vis nonemployment. Only in 2003, 2005, and 2006 there are significantly more flows from nonemployment to work for wages than the other way around.

Self-employment is not as persistent as in the whole sample. At the end of the observation period there are positive net flows from self-employment to work for wages. But at the same time (contrary to Armenia), the conditional probability to move from nonemployment to self-employment increases very strongly in 2006.

## 6.4 Belarus

In terms of aggregate work for wages and nonemployment, the transition shock has not really translated into micro-level labor market flows in Belarus. The share of work-for-wages respondents remains at a more or less constant level between 70% and 75%, while the nonemployment share fluctuates slightly around 17%. The only trend of the whole sample that is also replicated in Belarus is the steady increase of the self-employment share.

Although the conditional probability to move from work for wages to nonemployment tends to increase over time, there are positive net flows from nonemployment to work for wages in most of the years (no clear pattern over time).

The self-employment related flows fluctuate a lot, but for most of the time self-employment exhibits a positive net balance vis-a-vis work for wages and nonemployment. Exceptional strong inflows can be observed in 1996 (both from work for wages and nonemployment) and 2000 (from nonemployment).

## 6.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina

The labor market flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina are strongly affected by the Bosnian War 1992-1995. The nonemployment share increases from 50% in 1991 to a maximum of 75% in 1993 (2006: 35%), while the work for wages share decreases from 49% in 1991 to a minimum of 24% in 1993 (2006: 53%). Self-employment tends to increase considerably only from 1996 onwards.

Although the war effect apparently aggravated the general transition shock, Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to consolidate its net balance of work for wages vis-a-vis nonemployment rather quickly. From 1995 onwards there are always more flows from nonemployment to work for wages than the other way around. This could also reflect a high demand for workers needed for reconstruction after the war.

At the end of the observation period (later as for other countries), self-employment gains ground vis-a-vis the other two states. The conditional probability to move from nonemployment or work for wages to self-employment strongly increases in 2004 and 2005.

## 6.6 Bulgaria

There are no strong transition effects with respect to labor market movements in Bulgaria. But, nevertheless, the trends of the whole sample are also replicated in Bulgaria. The work-for-wages share decreases until 1995 to a minimum of 62% while the nonemployment share increases until 1995 to a maximum of 33%. The self-employment share increases steadily, but reaches only a level of about 8% in 2006, what is comparatively low.

There is no clear-cut pattern for the consolidation of the net balance of work for wages vis-a-vis nonemployment. If any, the flows from nonemployment to work for wages tend to outweigh the reverse flows after 2003

much stronger than before. In contrast to other countries, the self-employment related flows do not exhibit a meaningful trend.

## 6.7 Croatia

In contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the impact of the Croatian War of Independence (1990-1995) cannot really be disentangled from the general transition shock by simply inspecting our labor market flow data. The stocks exhibit trends similar to those of the whole sample. It is noteworthy that in 1989 nonemployment starts with a comparatively low share of only 16%.

Only in 1998, 2005 and 2006 there are significantly more flows from nonemployment to work for wages than the other way around. Substantial recovery seems to start only after 2004, when the conditional probability to move from nonemployment to work for wages increases substantially. The self-employment related flows fluctuate strongly and do not exhibit a clear-cut trend.

## 6.8 Czech Republic

In contrast to other countries, the transition shock at the beginning of the 90ies does not really lead to increasing outflows from work for wages to nonemployment. Rather, the decrease of the work-for-wages stock translates into an increase of self-employment. There are strong positive and increasing net flows from work for wages to self-employment until 1993. They remain positive (but at a smaller level) until 2004. The work-for-wages stock does not exhibit a U-shaped pattern as for other countries. It rather tends to decrease steadily from 80% in 1989 to 64% in 2006. At the same time, self-employment increases steadily from 3% in 1989 to 17% in 2006. Nonemployment fluctuates slightly around 18% over the whole time horizon.

## 6.9 Estonia

There are no strong transition effects with respect to labor market movements in Estonia. But, nevertheless, the trends of the whole sample are also replicated in Estonia. The work-for-wages share decreases until 1996 to a minimum of 64% while the nonemployment share increases until 1996 to a maximum of 29%. The self-employment share increases steadily to about 10% in 2006.

Although there are only a few years with more flows from work for wages to nonemployment than the other way around, it is noteworthy that this is not the case at the beginning of transition (as for many other countries), but in 2000 and 2001.

## **6.10 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia)**

The work-for-wages stock reaches its minimum and the nonemployment stock reaches its maximum comparatively late, namely only in 2002. Self-employment reaches after a steady increase a relatively high share of nearly 19% in 2006.

The conditional probability to move from nonemployment to work for wages remains more or less constant until 2004 and tends to increase only afterwards. On the other hand, the conditional probability to move from work for wages to self-employment tends to increase steadily over time. The over time increasing importance of the self-employment option in FYR Macedonia is also underlined by tendentiously increasing positive net flows from work for wages to self-employment (recall that for the whole sample this relation weakens over time).

## **6.11 Georgia**

As in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the nonemployment share lies in most of the years above the work-for-wages share. Beyond it, Georgia is the only country where the work-for-wages share lies for a few years below the self-employment share. These relations are the result of a strong initial decline of the work-for-wages share (from 57% in 1989 to 26% in 1994; the minimum of 19% is reached in 2001). Compared to other countries, there are high initial conditional probabilities to move from work for wages to nonemployment (reach about 18% in 1994). The conditional probabilities to move from work for wages to self-employment are also relatively high (reach about 14% in 2006). Also driven by strong inflows from nonemployment at the end of the observation period, the self-employment stock reaches with 28% in 2006 one of the highest shares throughout the region.

## **6.12 Hungary**

Hungary starts with a relatively very high share of work for wages (about 83% in 1989). There is a quite strong decrease of the work-for-wages share until 1992 (and, respectively, a strong increase of the nonemployment share). These movements continue moderately until 2002. It is remarkable that there are apparently two waves of restructuring in Hungary. After the initial transition shock the net flows from nonemployment to work for wages are for the first time substantially positive in 1993. Subsequently the flows from work for wages to nonemployment dominate again. Considerable recovery starts in contrast to other countries relatively late (only after 2004).

The self-employment share is one of the lowest throughout the region (reaches a maximum of 7%). Flows between self-employment and nonemployment are only pronounced at the end of the observation period.

## **6.13 Kazakhstan**

The transition shock substantially influences work-for-wage share during 1990-1996 years. During this period work-for-wage share falls from 77% in 1990 to 64% in 1996. After that work-for-wage share is quite stable and fluctuates from 64% to 70%. This reduction is accompanied by substantial increase in self-employment and moderate increase in unemployment. Self-employment sharply rises from 2% in 1991 to 12% in 2000.

The conditional probability to remain unemployed is rather non-stable and fluctuates between 75% and 90% without any trend. The conditional probability to move from work for wage to unemployment falls considerably in 1997 and after that it is about 1%.

## **6.14 Kyrgyzstan**

The transition shock significantly hits all 3 labor markets in Kyrgyzstan. Rather high level of initial unemployment (39% in 1989) becomes even larger after the transition and run up to 49% in 2004. The main increase of unemployment is during 1993-1996 years. Moderate decrease of work-for-wage share during 1989-1993 is followed by drastic decrease of this share for the next six years when it drops from 56% to 33%. After that this share continues to fall moderately and stabilizes only in 2004. This process is accompanied by quite quick increase in self-employment. The cumulative growth during the whole period of self-employment is equal to 19-20% (from 2% in 1989 to 22% in 2006). This growth is especially high during 1993-1996 when the self-employment share rise from 8% to 18%.

The conditional probability to move from work for wage to self-employment begins to rise immediately after the beginning of transition and reaches a peak in 1996 when it is equal to 7%. After that it fluctuates in the range from 1% to 4%. As in Kazakhstan the conditional probability to remain unemployed is quite volatile although it begins to fall steadily after 2002.

## **6.15 Latvia**

The impact of transition is quite moderate in Latvia in comparison with average indices. Latvia has quite high initial level of work-for-wage share (78% in 1990). The lowest meaning of this share is reached in 1998 when it equals 68%. The self-employment share increased steadily from 2% in 1989 to 12% in 2006. The level of unemployment doesn't exhibit any clear trend and remains quite low. The unemployment share exceeds 20% only for 6 years (during 1996-2001).

Although the conditional probability to remain unemployed is rather volatile it is quite low in comparison with other countries. In 1990, 1994 and 2006 this probability is less than 70%. The share of people who move from work for wage to self-employment in a given year fluctuates between 0% and 2%. Very small share of

self-employed people move to unemployment during the whole period (it is significantly different from 0 only in 1993, 1995 and 2000 years).

## 6.16 Lithuania

The work-for-wage share falls steadily until 2002 except for 1995-1997 years. During 1995-1997 this share rises partially because of a fall in unemployment rate and partially because of a bit fall of self-employment. Nevertheless the work-for-wage share is higher than average level in other countries during the whole period. After 2004 this share increases dramatically from less than 60% to approximately 70% in 2005 and 2006 years. Self-employment increases quite steadily from 2-3% in 1989 to 10% in 2004. Then the self-employment share stabilizes in 2005 and began to drop in 2006. This drop is resulted from increase of the conditional probability to move from self-employment to work-for-wage.

One can distinguish two impacts of the transition shock on unemployment. First, the unemployment share rises during 1989 to 1996 years. Then, in 1997, this share falls because of increase of the conditional probability to move from unemployment to work for wage and continues to rise beginning from 1998. This increase lasts until 2002 when this share begins to fall due to increase in the conditional probability of move from unemployment to work for wage.

The overall pattern of trajectories of stocks in Lithuania is quite similar to the pattern for the whole region.

## 6.17 Moldova

Transition shock was very drastic in Moldova. The work-for-wage share falls sharply from 78% in 1989 to about 50% in 1998. At the same time the unemployment share rises from less than 20% to 39%, the self-employment share also rises and reached 10% (beginning from 2% in 1989). After that there was moderate stabilization in the country, the work for wage share begins to rise slightly while unemployment starts to drop and reached 30% in 2005. Since 1998 self-employment demonstrates quite quick increase and comes near 20% in the next 2 years. Then it fluctuates between 16-18% /

The conditional probability to move from work for wage to self-employment rises from 0% in 1989 to 2% in 1996 and remains stable after that. There was very high jump in the conditional probability to move from unemployment to self-employment in 2000 when it was 13%. In all other years this probability demonstrates similar pattern as the whole region.

## **6.18 Mongolia**

The drop of the work-for-wage share was very large in Mongolia. This share falls from 65% in 1965 to 40% in 1997. Part of people who leave work for wage become unemployed (the unemployment share rises from 30% in 1989 to 42% in 1997) while another part become self-employed (the self-employment share rises from 2% in 1989 to 20% in 1997). Since 1997 the work for wage share is quite stable and fluctuates around 40%. At the same time unemployment falls while the self-employment share continues to grow very quickly. At the end of the period in question the self-employed amount to 30%. So Mongolia is quite interesting country in the sense that in 2006 shares of work for wage, unemployment and self-employment are almost equal to each other.

## **6.19 Montenegro**

During the whole period Montenegro has very high level of unemployment. Beginning from 40% in 1989 unemployment rises to 47% in 1998. After that it remains stable at the reached level until 2004 when it begins to fall quickly. Self-employment rises very steadily without any reversals from 2% in 1989 to 10% in 2006. There is relatively small decrease of the work-for-wage share in Montenegro: this share falls from 58% in 1989 to 48% in 1998. After that the work-for-wage share fluctuates around 49% and begins to increase in 2004 due to drop in the level of unemployment.

Montenegro has quite persistent self-employment state: the conditional probability of move from self-employment to unemployment is significantly more than zero only after 1998, move to work for wage fluctuates around 5% what is less than average. Poland:

The transition shock in Poland results in rather high decrease in the work-for-wage share and rather high increase in the level of unemployment. The unemployment share approximately doubles beginning from 21% in 1989 and ending with 40% in 1997. At the same time the work-for-wage share falls from 71% in 1989 to 50% in 1997. After that these share are quite stable and fluctuates around reached values. The self-employment share fluctuates with a bit positive trend during the whole period. The overall pattern of trajectories of stocks is similar to the average in the region pattern.

The conditional probability to remain unemployed is rather volatile and fluctuates between 85% and 95%. In contrast with the whole sample this probability in Poland doesn't begin to fall after 2001 and remains quite high.

## **6.20 Romania**

Main changes in Romania's labor market are in 1989-1991. During this time the work-for-wage share falls by 10% from 72% in 1989 to 62% in 1991, unemployment rises from 20% to 33%, the self-employment share falls from 8% to 3%. In contrast to other countries the self-employment share falls after the beginning of transition

while in other countries it increases. After that time the labor market is quite stable although work for wage continues to drop and unemployment continues to rise until 1998. Since that time one can see reverse trends: work for wage demonstrates small increase and unemployment decreases slightly. The self-employment rises a bit beginning from 1992 and reaches 9% in 2003 (although there are small reversals in 1995 and 2001).

There was quite high jump in the conditional probability of move from unemployment to self-employment in 1996-1998 years when this probability fluctuates between 3-6%. There also were quick flows between work for wage and self-employment in both directions in 2000.

## 6.21 Russia

The transition shock was almost imperceptible in Russia. In contrast to many other countries in the sample work for wage actually rises and unemployment falls until 1994. The work-for-wage share fluctuates around 75% with quite moderate volatility while the unemployment share fluctuates around 20% without any visible trends and also has rather small volatility. The self-employment share fluctuates with very small positive trend.

There was the very large conditional probability of move from self-employment to work for wage in 1992, 1994 and 2006 years when this probability was equal to 10%, 28% and 20% respectively. These figures are much higher than corresponding average figures in the whole sample.

## 6.22 Serbia

One can identify two waves of labor market restructuring in Serbia. The first wave is in 1989-1993. During this period the work-for-wage falls by 13% from 73% in 1989 to 60% in 1993 while unemployment rate increases from 23% to 35%. At the same time self-employment increases doesn't show any visible trend. The second wave of restructuring is in 1997-1999 when the work-for-wage share decreases by additional 5% and unemployment rises by additional 4%. Since that year work for wage and self-employment increases while unemployment decreases.

The conditional probability to remain unemployed begins to fall from 96% in 1998 and reaches the level of 76% in 2006. At the end of the surveyed period there is quite large conditional probability to move from unemployment to work for wage: beginning from 2000 year this probability fluctuates between 10% and 23%.

## 6.23 Slovak Republic

Slovak Republic experiences the quite moderate transition shock. During the whole surveyed period the work-for-wage share falls steadily from 78% in 1989 to 65% in 2005. At the same time self-employment rises from 2% to 10%. Unemployment fluctuates around 20%. It should be mentioned that in contrast to many other countries the unemployment rate in Slovak Republic decreases by 2% in the first two years of the surveyed period.

There are only two years when people from unemployment move to self-employment in Slovak Republic: 1992 and 1995. However the flow in the opposite direction is also very small: self-employed persons become unemployed only in 2000 and 2004. At the same time there is quite large flow from unemployment to work for wage: during the surveyed period the conditional probability to move from unemployment to work for wage fluctuates between 5% and 25% while average meaning of this probability in surveyed countries is about 6-8% almost all time.

## 6.24 Slovenia

As in Slovak Republic there is no large transition shock in Slovenia. The work-for-wage share decreases from 70% in 1990 to 65% in 1992 while unemployment increases from 22% to 29% at the same time. The work-for-wage share rises by 6% in 1996-1999 while the unemployment share drops by 6% at the same time. There are also quite quick increase of work for wage and decrease of unemployment in 2004-2006 (8% and 9% correspondingly). The self-employment share fluctuates with some positive trend: beginning from 2% in 1989 it reaches 10% in 2006.

As in Slovak Republic there is very small conditional probability to move from self-employment to unemployment in Slovenia: in the survey people move from self-employment to unemployment only in 1991 and 2004. There is also quite large flow from unemployment to work for wage (the average value of the corresponding conditional probability in Slovenia is about 10%).

## 6.25 Tajikistan

Drop of work for wage and increase of unemployment begin in 1991 in Tajikistan and continue until 1999. During this period the work-for-wage share falls by 18% from 62% in 1991 to 44% in 1999 while the unemployment share rises by 15% from 33% in 1991 to 48% in 1999. 1999 is the only year when unemployment is higher than work for wage. Since that year work for wage increases and unemployment decreases. There are two waves of increase in self-employment in Tajikistan. The first wave lasts for 5 years beginning from 1991. During this wave the self-employment increases from 2% to 9%. The second wave is in 2002-2005 when the share in question rises by 7% from 10% in 2002 to 17% in 2005.

There is quite large conditional probability to remain unemployed in Tajikistan: this probability fluctuates between 90% and 95%. The fall of this probability begins in 2002. Although the conditional probability to move from work for wage to self-employment is rather moderate in most years until 2000 it is quite high in 1995 when it is equal to 4%. Tajikistan also has very volatile conditional probability to move from self-employment to unemployment: although in some years there are no people who move in this direction, in some other years this probability approaches 20%.

## **6.26 Turkey**

During the whole surveyed period Turkey has very large unemployment rate. The share of unemployed people is 48% in 1989 and continues to fluctuate around 50% during the whole period. In comparison with other countries this high level of unemployment is connected with very low level of work for wage. Beginning from 22% in 1989 the work-for-wage share increases to 30% in 1990 and then fluctuates around 30% until 2004. Since 2004 the work-for-wage share rises by 7% in the next 2 years while the unemployment share falls by 8%. In contrast to other countries Turkey has very high initial level of self-employment (30%). This state of the labor market in Turkey has some tendency to reduce: during the surveyed period its share fluctuates with some negative trend and reaches 21% in 2006.

Unemployed people in Turkey have quite small probability to move from unemployment on comparison with other countries: this probability is rather flat in Turkey and fluctuates around 95% until 2004. This low probability to move from unemployment is accompanied by both low conditional probabilities to move from unemployment to work for wage and self-employment.

## **6.27 Ukraine**

As in case of Russia there is quite moderate transition shock in Ukraine. The work-for-wage share fluctuates around 70% demonstrating only small negative trend until 1998: this share decreases by 10% from 78% in 1989 to 68% in 1998. Unemployment is also quite stable in Ukraine: its share fluctuates around 20-22% during the whole surveyed period with small negative trend until 1998. The unemployment share reaches its peak 28% in 1998 (beginning from 20% in 1989). After that it demonstrates some tendency to reduce. The self-employment share steadily grows in Ukraine from 2% in 1989 to 10% in 2005.

Unemployed people in Ukraine have quite large probability to move to work for wage: value of corresponding conditional probability fluctuates between 10% and 20% almost all time. There is very large conditional probability to move from self-employment both to unemployment and work for wage in 1992 (14% and 36% correspondingly). In addition, there are large conditional probabilities to move from self-employment to unemployment in 1997 and 1998 (8% and 15% correspondingly).

## **6.28 Uzbekistan**

In contrast to many other countries the self-employment share in Uzbekistan increases very quickly. Beginning from 5% in 1989 it reaches 30% in 2006. Moreover, the work-for-wage share also increases in the first 5 years of the surveyed period (from 60% in 1989 to 65% in 1994) while unemployment decreases from 31% to 23. After that the work-for-wage share falls but unemployment doesn't rise because of very high growth rate in self-employment.

Such high growth of self-employment is partially due to low conditional probability to move from self-employment to unemployment (its value doesn't exceed 0.5% in 14 years out of 17 in the survey) and partially due to quite high conditional probability to move from unemployment to self-employment (its value fluctuates between 1% and 4% in most of the surveyed years).

Table 1: Labor Market States, Stocks in %, 1990 vs. 2006

	1990	Work for Wages	2006	1990	Nonemployment	2006	1990	Self-employment	2006
Turkey	29.5	Georgia	25.7	Latvia	15.2	Latvia	15.4	Bosnia	0.9
Armenia	45.8	Kyrgyzstan	32	Czech Rep.	16.5	Belarus	16.3	Lithuania	1.2
Georgia	50.5	Turkey	35.2	Slovak Rep.	17.3	Russia	16.9	Kazakhstan	1.6
Bosnia	54.9	Armenia	39.1	Croatia	17.5	Slovenia	17	Estonia	1.7
Azerbaijan	56.2	Albania	39.1	Hungary	17.6	Kazakhstan	17.1	Albania	2.1
Montenegro	57.1	Mongolia	41.5	Russia	19.5	Czech Rep.	18.4	Tajikistan	2.4
Kyrgyzstan	57.7	Azerbaijan	42.3	Belarus	22.1	Ukraine	18.5	Russia	2.6
FYR Macedonia	59.9	FYR Macedonia	44.4	Moldova	22.1	Estonia	19.7	Bulgaria	2.8
Uzbekistan	60.5	Uzbekistan	47.4	Kazakhstan	22.5	Slovak Rep.	19.9	Ukraine	10
Mongolia	63.3	Tajikistan	49.1	Slovenia	22.8	Croatia	20.4	Estonia	10.2
Tajikistan	63.4	Montenegro	51.6	Ukraine	23.9	Uzbekistan	21.7	Hungary	2.9
Poland	66.6	Poland	53.2	Estonia	25.1	Bulgaria	22.4	Montenegro	3
Romania	67.4	Bosnia	53.4	Lithuania	25.7	Lithuania	24.1	Croatia	11.4
Serbia	69	Moldova	54	Romania	25.9	Hungary	24.9	Slovenia	3.6
Albania	70.3	Romania	60.8	Bulgaria	26.1	Serbia	24.9	Serbia	11
Slovenia	71.1	Serbia	64.1	Poland	26.1	Mongolia	26.8	Montenegro	3.9
Bulgaria	71.1	Czech Rep.	64.6	Serbia	27	Romania	31	Bulgaria	11.6
Ukraine	72.5	Slovak Rep.	67.5	Albania	27.7	Moldova	33.3	Serbia	3.9
Lithuania	73.1	Croatia	68	Uzbekistan	31.5	Poland	33.6	Moldova	4.2
Estonia	73.2	Hungary	68.1	Mongolia	32.4	Albania	34.7	Mongolia	4.4
Belarus	73.4	Kazakhstan	69	FYR Macedonia	32.4	Bosnia	34.9	Belarus	4.5
Moldova	73.7	Lithuania	69.3	Tajikistan	34.2	Tajikistan	35	Latvia	4.6
Kazakhstan	75.9	Belarus	69.7	Kyrgyzstan	37	Montenegro	37	Czech Rep.	13.1
Croatia	77.1	Bulgaria	69.9	Azerbaijan	37.6	FYR Macedonia	37.1	Kyrgyzstan	14
Russia	77.9	Estonia	70.1	Montenegro	40.1	Azerbaijan	42.1	Armenia	14
Czech Rep.	78.8	Latvia	71.5	Georgia	41.9	Turkey	42.7	Slovenia	6.1
Slovak Rep.	78.8	Ukraine	71.6	Bosnia	44.2	Kyrgyzstan	45.2	Azerbaijan	6.2
Hungary	79.4	Slovenia	73.1	Turkey	45.9	Georgia	46	Romania	6.7
Latvia	80.2	Russia	77.4	Armenia	48.2	Armenia	53.6	Poland	7.2

Note: The shares refer to male within-working-age respondents (with an age between 18 and 60).

Table 2: State and Private Sector Employment, Stocks in %, 1990 vs. 2006

State Sector Employment			Private Sector Employment		
1990	2006		1990	2006	
Turkey	12.1	Turkey	6.5	Belarus	4.9
Armenia	33.9	Georgia	12.1	Uzbekistan	5.7
Georgia	43	Estonia	13.7	Mongolia	6
FYR Macedonia	43.7	Lithuania	14.7	Kyrgyzstan	6.2
	43.9	Hungary	14.7	Georgia	7.4
	44.7	Albania	15.7	Kazakhstan	8.7
	45.4	Kyrgyzstan	15.8	Montenegro	9.1
	46.8	Armenia	17.2	Albania	10
Czech Rep.	47.2	Latvia	17.9	Ukraine	10.6
Montenegro	47.8	Czech Rep.	18	Bosnia	10.7
Slovenia	47.8	FYR Macedonia	18.6	Azerbaijan	10.7
Hungary	49.5	Poland	19.1	Armenia	11.6
Tajikistan	50.7	Bulgaria	19.9	Tajikistan	12.7
Kyrgyzstan	51.5	Romania	19.9	Russia	13.2
Romania	52.9	Azerbaijan	22.3	Serbia	13.5
Lithuania	53.1	Slovak Rep.	22.5	Romania	13.8
Croatia	53.1	Kazakhstan	23.8	Moldova	14.8
Slovak Rep.	53.7	Mongolia	25.1	Bulgaria	15.3
Uzbekistan	54.8	Serbia	25.3	FYR Macedonia	15.6
Serbia	55.4	Montenegro	25.7	Turkey	17.4
Bulgaria	55.8	Bosnia	26	Poland	19.6
Mongolia	57.3	Moldova	26.1	Lithuania	20.1
Moldova	58.8	Russia	26.3	Latvia	20.2
Latvia	59.5	Tajikistan	27.1	Slovenia	22.5
Albania	60.2	Croatia	28.3	Croatia	24
Ukraine	61.3	Ukraine	28.8	Slovak Rep.	24.7
Russia	64.6	Slovenia	28.9	Estonia	28.1
Kazakhstan	66.9	Uzbekistan	30.4	Hungary	29.7
Belarus	68.5	Belarus	52.4	Czech Rep.	30.7

Note: The shares refer to male within-working-age respondents (with an age between 18 and 60).

Table 3: High-Skill and Low- or Medium-Skill Employment, Stocks in %, 1990 vs. 2006

High-Skill Employment			Low- or Medium-Skill Employment		
1990	2006		1990	2006	
Turkey	3.7	Albania	4.9	Turkey	25.8
Serbia	5.1	Bosnia	5.3	Armenia	33.4
Bosnia	5.7	Turkey	5.9	Georgia	35.8
Poland	6.6	Bulgaria	7.3	Azerbaijan	39.9
Albania	7.3	Poland	7.6	Mongolia	43.4
Czech Rep.	8.3	Kyrgyzstan	8.3	Montenegro	46.4
Croatia	8.6	Montenegro	8.4	FYR Macedonia	46.6
Hungary	9.5	Azerbaijan	8.4	Kyrgyzstan	47.1
Latvia	9.8	Serbia	8.6	Bosnia	49.3
Romania	10	Hungary	9	Uzbekistan	49.3
Slovenia	10.4	Georgia	9.2	Tajikistan	52.1
Kyrgyzstan	10.6	Romania	9.5	Belarus	54.7
Montenegro	10.6	Czech Rep.	9.7	Ukraine	55.4
Bulgaria	11.2	Tajikistan	9.9	Romania	57.4
Uzbekistan	11.2	Uzbekistan	10.2	Russia	59.5
Tajikistan	11.3	Estonia	10.4	Bulgaria	59.9
Kazakhstan	11.7	Moldova	10.5	Poland	60
Lithuania	12.1	Armenia	10.5	Estonia	60.1
Armenia	12.4	FYR Macedonia	10.9	Slovenia	60.7
Moldova	12.7	Croatia	11.2	Moldova	61
Estonia	13	Kazakhstan	12.2	Lithuania	61
FYR Macedonia	13.3	Latvia	12.3	Albania	62.9
Slovak Rep.	14.3	Slovenia	12.9	Serbia	64
Georgia	14.7	Mongolia	13.8	Kazakhstan	64.2
Azerbaijan	16.3	Lithuania	14.8	Slovak Rep.	64.6
Ukraine	17.2	Slovak Rep.	15	Croatia	68.6
Russia	18.4	Russia	18.2	Hungary	69.9
Belarus	18.7	Belarus	23.3	Estonia	70.4
Mongolia	19.9	Ukraine	25.3	Slovenia	70.4

Note: The shares refer to male within-working-age respondents (with an age between 18 and 60).

## APPENDIX 1: NET FLOWS AND STOCKS

This Appendix visualizes net labor market flows and stocks for the whole region and for each of the 29 transition countries. The net flows and stocks are presented as percentages of male within-working-age respondents (between 18 and 60 years old). To assess whether the flow trajectories changed significantly, we highlight the standard errors for each point in time. Following labor market states are presented: (1) work for wages, (1a) work for wages in the state sector (state sector employment), (1b) work for wages in the private sector (private sector employment), (1c) work for wages in an occupation requiring high skills (high-skill employment), (1d) work for wages in an occupation not requiring high skills (low- or medium-skill employment), (2) self-employment, and (3) nonemployment.

# List of Figures

A1.1 ALL: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	27
A1.2 ALL: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	28
A1.3 ALL: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	29
A1.4 ALBANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	30
A1.5 ALBANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	31
A1.6 ALBANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	32
A1.7 ARMENIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	33
A1.8 ARMENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	34
A1.9 ARMENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	35
A1.10 AZERBAIJAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	36
A1.11 AZERBAIJAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	37
A1.12 AZERBAIJAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	38
A1.13 BELARUS: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	39
A1.14 BELARUS: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	40
A1.15 BELARUS: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	41
A1.16 BOSNIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	42
A1.17 BOSNIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	43
A1.18 BOSNIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	44
A1.19 BULGARIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	45
A1.20 BULGARIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	46
A1.21 BULGARIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	47
A1.22 CROATIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	48
A1.23 CROATIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	49
A1.24 CROATIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	50
A1.25 CZECHREP: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	51
A1.26 CZECHREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	52
A1.27 CZECHREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	53
A1.28 ESTONIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	54
A1.29 ESTONIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	55
A1.30 ESTONIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	56
A1.31 FYROM: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	57
A1.32 FYROM: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	58
A1.33 FYROM: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	59
A1.34 GEORGIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	60
A1.35 GEORGIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	61
A1.36 GEORGIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	62
A1.37 HUNGARY: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	63
A1.38 HUNGARY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	64
A1.39 HUNGARY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	65
A1.40 KAZAKHSTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	66
A1.41 KAZAKHSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	67
A1.42 KAZAKHSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	68
A1.43 KYRGYZSTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	69

A1.44 KYRGYZSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	70
A1.45 KYRGYZSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	71
A1.46 LATVIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	72
A1.47 LATVIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	73
A1.48 LATVIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	74
A1.49 LITHUANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	75
A1.50 LITHUANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	76
A1.51 LITHUANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	77
A1.52 MOLDOVA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	78
A1.53 MOLDOVA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	79
A1.54 MOLDOVA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	80
A1.55 MONGOLIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	81
A1.56 MONGOLIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	82
A1.57 MONGOLIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	83
A1.58 MONTENEGRO: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	84
A1.59 MONTENEGRO: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	85
A1.60 MONTENEGRO: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	86
A1.61 POLAND: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	87
A1.62 POLAND: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	88
A1.63 POLAND: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	89
A1.64 ROMANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	90
A1.65 ROMANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	91
A1.66 ROMANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	92
A1.67 RUSSIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	93
A1.68 RUSSIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	94
A1.69 RUSSIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	95
A1.70 SERBIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	96
A1.71 SERBIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	97
A1.72 SERBIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	98
A1.73 SLOVAKREP: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	99
A1.74 SLOVAKREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	100
A1.75 SLOVAKREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	101
A1.76 SLOVENIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	102
A1.77 SLOVENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	103
A1.78 SLOVENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	104
A1.79 TAJIKISTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	105
A1.80 TAJIKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	106
A1.81 TAJIKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	107
A1.82 TURKEY: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	108
A1.83 TURKEY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	109
A1.84 TURKEY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	110
A1.85 UKRAINE: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	111
A1.86 UKRAINE: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	112
A1.87 UKRAINE: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	113
A1.88 UZBEKISTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	114
A1.89 UZBEKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	115
A1.90 UZBEKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS . . . . .	116

Figure A1.1: ALL: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: all, gender: male





Figure A1.2: ALL: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: all, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.3: ALL: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: all, gender: male





Figure A1.4: ALBANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: albania, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: albania, gender: male

Figure A1.5: ALBANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS




Figure A1.6: ALBANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: albania, gender: male




Figure A1.7: ARMENIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: armenia, gender: male





Figure A1.8: ARMENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: armenia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.9: ARMENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: armenia, gender: male





Figure A1.10: AZERBAIJAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: azerbaijan, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.11: AZERBAIJAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: azerbaijan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.12: AZERBAIJAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: azerbaijan, gender: male




Figure A1.13: BELARUS: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: belarus, gender: male






Figure A1.14: BELARUS: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: belarus, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: belarus, gender: male

Figure A1.15: BELARUS: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.16: BOSNIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: bosnia, gender: male




Figure A1.17: BOSNIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: bosnia, gender: male





Figure A1.18: BOSNIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: bosnia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: bulgaria, gender: male

Figure A1.19: BULGARIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS






Figure A1.20: BULGARIA: STATE V/S. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: bulgaria, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: bulgaria, gender: male

Figure A1.21: BULGARIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: croatia, gender: male

Figure A1.22: CROATIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS




Figure A1.23: CROATIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: croatia, gender: male





Figure A1.24: CROATIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: croatia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.25: CZECHREP: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: czechrep, gender: male




Figure A1.26: CZECHREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: czechrep, gender: male




Figure A1.27: CZECHREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: czechrep, gender: male




Figure A1.28: ESTONIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: estonia, gender: male





Figure A1.29: ESTONIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: estonia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: estonia, gender: male

Figure A1.30: ESTONIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: fyrom, gender: male

Figure A1.31: FYROM: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.32: FYROM: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


## labor market net flows and stocks, country: fyrom, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: fyrom, gender: male


Figure A1.33: FYROM: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: georgia, gender: male


Figure A1.34: GEORGIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.35: GEORGIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: georgia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.36: GEORGIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: georgia, gender: male




Figure A1.37: HUNGARY: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: hungary, gender: male




Figure A1.38: HUNGARY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: hungary, gender: male






Figure A1.39: HUNGARY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: hungary, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: kazakhstan, gender: male

Figure A1.40: KAZAKHSTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: kazakhstan, gender: male

Figure A1.41: KAZAKHSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.42: KAZAKHSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: kazakhstan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male

Figure A1.43: KYRGYZSTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.44: KYRGYZSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.45: KYRGYZSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.46: LATVIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: latvia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.47: LATVIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: latvia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.48: LATVIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: latvia, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: lithuania, gender: male

Figure A1.49: LITHUANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.50: LITHUANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: lithuania, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: lithuania, gender: male

Figure A1.51: LITHUANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS




Figure A1.52: MOLDOVA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: moldova, gender: male





Figure A1.53: MOLDOVA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: moldova, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.54: MOLDOVA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: moldova, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: mongolia, gender: male

Figure A1.55: MONGOLIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.56: MONGOLIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: mongolia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.57: MONGOLIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: mongolia, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: montenegro, gender: male

Figure A1.58: MONTENEGRO: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS






Figure A1.59: MONTENEGRO: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: montenegro, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: montenegro, gender: male

Figure A1.60: MONTENEGRO: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.61: POLAND: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: poland, gender: male




Figure A1.62: POLAND: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: poland, gender: male





Figure A1.63: POLAND: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: poland, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: romania, gender: male


Figure A1.64: ROMANIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: romania, gender: male


Figure A1.65: ROMANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.66: ROMANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: romania, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: russia, gender: male

Figure A1.67: RUSSIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.68: RUSSIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


## labor market net flows and stocks, country: russia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: russia, gender: male

Figure A1.69: RUSSIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.70: SERBIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: serbia, gender: male






Figure A1.71: SERBIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: serbia, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: serbia, gender: male


Figure A.1.72: SERBIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.73: SLOVAKREP: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovakrep, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovakrep, gender: male

Figure A1.74: SLOVAKREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS





Figure A1.75: SLOVAKREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovakrep, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.76: SLOVENIA: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovenia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.77: SLOVENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovenia, gender: male






Figure A.1.78: SLOVENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: slovenia, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: tajikistan, gender: male


Figure A1.79: TAJIKISTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.80: TAJIKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: tajikistan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.81: TAJIKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: tajikistan, gender: male




Figure A1.82: TURKEY: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: turkey, gender: male






Figure A1.83: TURKEY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: turkey, gender: male



## labor market net flows and stocks, country: turkey, gender: male

Figure A1.84: TURKEY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

## labor market net flows and stocks, country: ukraine, gender: male

Figure A1.85: UKRAINE: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS




Figure A1.86: UKRAINE: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: ukraine, gender: male




Figure A1.87: UKRAINE: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: ukraine, gender: male




Figure A1.88: UZBEKISTAN: AGGREGATE NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: uzbekistan, gender: male





Figure A1.89: UZBEKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR NETFLOWS AND STOCKS


### labor market net flows and stocks, country: uzbekistan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment

Figure A1.90: UZBEKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION NETFLOWS AND STOCKS

### labor market net flows and stocks, country: uzbekistan, gender: male



## APPENDIX 2: GROSS FLOWS

This Appendix visualizes the conditional probabilities to move between different labor market states. These gross labor market flows are presented for the whole region and for each of the 29 transition countries. They are calculated for male within-working-age respondents (between 18 and 60 years old). To assess whether the flow trajectories changed significantly, we highlight the standard errors for each point in time. We refer to following labor market states: (1) work for wages, (1a) work for wages in the state sector (state sector employment), (1b) work for wages in the private sector (private sector employment), (1c) work for wages in an occupation requiring high skills (high-skill employment), (1d) work for wages in an occupation not requiring high skills (low- or medium-skill employment), (2) self-employment, and (3) nonemployment.


# List of Figures

A2.1 ALL: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	120
A2.2 ALL: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	121
A2.3 ALL: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	122
A2.4 ALBANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	123
A2.5 ALBANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	124
A2.6 ALBANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	125
A2.7 ARMENIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	126
A2.8 ARMENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	127
A2.9 ARMENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	128
A2.10 AZERBAIJAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	129
A2.11 AZERBAIJAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	130
A2.12 AZERBAIJAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	131
A2.13 BELARUS: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	132
A2.14 BELARUS: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	133
A2.15 BELARUS: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	134
A2.16 BOSNIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	135
A2.17 BOSNIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	136
A2.18 BOSNIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	137
A2.19 BULGARIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	138
A2.20 BULGARIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	139
A2.21 BULGARIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	140
A2.22 CROATIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	141
A2.23 CROATIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	142
A2.24 CROATIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	143
A2.25 CZECHREP: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	144
A2.26 CZECHREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	145
A2.27 CZECHREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	146
A2.28 ESTONIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	147
A2.29 ESTONIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	148
A2.30 ESTONIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	149
A2.31 FYROM: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	150
A2.32 FYROM: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	151
A2.33 FYROM: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	152
A2.34 GEORGIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	153
A2.35 GEORGIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	154
A2.36 GEORGIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	155
A2.37 HUNGARY: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	156
A2.38 HUNGARY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	157
A2.39 HUNGARY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	158
A2.40 KAZAKHSTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	159
A2.41 KAZAKHSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	160
A2.42 KAZAKHSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	161
A2.43 KYRGYZSTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	162

A2.44 KYRGYZSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	163
A2.45 KYRGYZSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	164
A2.46 LATVIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	165
A2.47 LATVIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	166
A2.48 LATVIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	167
A2.49 LITHUANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	168
A2.50 LITHUANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	169
A2.51 LITHUANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	170
A2.52 MOLDOVA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	171
A2.53 MOLDOVA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	172
A2.54 MOLDOVA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	173
A2.55 MONGOLIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	174
A2.56 MONGOLIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	175
A2.57 MONGOLIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	176
A2.58 MONTENEGRO: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	177
A2.59 MONTENEGRO: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	178
A2.60 MONTENEGRO: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	179
A2.61 POLAND: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	180
A2.62 POLAND: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	181
A2.63 POLAND: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	182
A2.64 ROMANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	183
A2.65 ROMANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	184
A2.66 ROMANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	185
A2.67 RUSSIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	186
A2.68 RUSSIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	187
A2.69 RUSSIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	188
A2.70 SERBIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	189
A2.71 SERBIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	190
A2.72 SERBIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	191
A2.73 SLOVAKREP: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	192
A2.74 SLOVAKREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	193
A2.75 SLOVAKREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	194
A2.76 SLOVENIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	195
A2.77 SLOVENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	196
A2.78 SLOVENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	197
A2.79 TAJIKISTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	198
A2.80 TAJIKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	199
A2.81 TAJIKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	200
A2.82 TURKEY: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	201
A2.83 TURKEY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	202
A2.84 TURKEY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	203
A2.85 UKRAINE: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	204
A2.86 UKRAINE: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	205
A2.87 UKRAINE: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	206
A2.88 UZBEKISTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	207
A2.89 UZBEKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	208
A2.90 UZBEKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS . . . . .	209

Figure A2.1: ALL: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: all, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.2: ALL: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: all, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.


Figure A2.3: ALL: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: all, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


Figure A2.4: ALBANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: albania, gender: male


Figure A2.5: ALBANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.6: ALBANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: albania, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.7: ARMENIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: armenia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: armenia, gender: male


Figure A2.8: ARMENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.9: ARMENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: armenia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.10: AZERBAIJAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: azerbaijan, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.11: AZERBAIJAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: azerbaijan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.12: AZERBAIJAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: azerbaijan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.13: BELARUS: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: belarus, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.14: BELARUS: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: belarus, gender: male





Figure A2.15: BELARUS: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: belarus, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


## labor market flows, country: bosnia, gender: male

Figure A2.16: BOSNIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



## labor market flows, country: bosnia, gender: male


Figure A2.17: BOSNIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.18: BOSNIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: bosnia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.19: BULGARIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: bulgaria, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: bulgaria, gender: male

Figure A2.20: BULGARIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.21: BULGARIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: bulgaria, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: croatia, gender: male


Figure A2.22: CROATIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.23: CROATIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: croatia, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.24: CROATIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: croatia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.25: CZECHREP: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: czechrep, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: czechrep, gender: male


Figure A2.26: CZECHREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: czechrep, gender: male


Figure A2.27: CZECHREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: estonia, gender: male


Figure A2.28: ESTONIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: estonia, gender: male


Figure A2.29: ESTONIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


## labor market flows, country: estonia, gender: male

Figure A2.30: ESTONIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS



## labor market flows, country: fyrom, gender: male

Figure A2.31: FYROM: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: fyrom, gender: male

Figure A2.32: FYROM: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.33: FYROM: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: fyrom, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.34: GEORGIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: georgia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: georgia, gender: male

Figure A2.35: GEORGIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.36: GEORGIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: georgia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: hungary, gender: male


Figure A2.37: HUNGARY: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: hungary, gender: male


Figure A2.38: HUNGARY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.39: HUNGARY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: hungary, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...medium-skill employment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.40: KAZAKHSTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: kazakhstan, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.41: KAZAKHSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: kazakhstan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.42: KAZAKHSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

## labor market flows, country: kazakhstan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.43: KYRGYZSTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male





Figure A2.44: KYRGYZSTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


Figure A2.45: KYRGYZSTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

## labor market flows, country: kyrgyzstan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.46: LATVIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



## labor market flows, country: latvia, gender: male

Figure A2.47: LATVIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.48: LATVIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: latvia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.49: LITHUANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: lithuania, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.50: LITHUANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: lithuania, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: lithuania, gender: male


Figure A2.51: LITHUANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: moldova, gender: male


Figure A2.52: MOLDOVA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: moldova, gender: male

Figure A2.53: MOLDOVA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: moldova, gender: male

Figure A2.54: MOLDOVA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.55: MONGOLIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: mongolia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: mongolia, gender: male


Figure A2.56: MONGOLIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: mongolia, gender: male


Figure A2.57: MONGOLIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.58: MONTENEGRO: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: montenegro, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.59: MONTENEGRO: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: montenegro, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.60: MONTENEGRO: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


## labor market flows, country: montenegro, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.61: POLAND: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: poland, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: poland, gender: male


Figure A2.62: POLAND: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


Figure A2.63: POLAND: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

## labor market flows, country: poland, gender: male



## labor market flows, country: romania, gender: male


Figure A2.64: ROMANIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.65: ROMANIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: romania, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: romania, gender: male


Figure A2.66: ROMANIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.67: RUSSIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: russia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: russia, gender: male


Figure A2.68: RUSSIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.69: RUSSIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: russia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.70: SERBIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: serbia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: serbia, gender: male


Figure A2.71: SERBIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.72: SERBIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: serbia, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.73: SLOVAKREP: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: slovakrep, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.74: SLOVAKREP: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: slovakrep, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.75: SLOVAKREP: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.76: SLOVENIA: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: slovenia, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: slovenia, gender: male


Figure A2.77: SLOVENIA: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.


Figure A2.78: SLOVENIA: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

labor market flows, country: slovenia, gender: male



## labor market flows, country: tajikistan, gender: male


Figure A2.79: TAJIKISTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: tajikistan, gender: male

Figure A2.80: TAJIKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: tajikistan, gender: male

Figure A2.81: TAJIKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS




Figure A2.82: TURKEY: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS




Figure A2.83: TURKEY: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: turkey, gender: male





Figure A2.84: TURKEY: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: turkey, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.85: UKRAINE: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS


### labor market flows, country: ukraine, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.86: UKRAINE: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: ukraine, gender: male



1a...state sector employment, 1b...private sector employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.

## labor market flows, country: ukraine, gender: male

Figure A2.87: UKRAINE: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS





Figure A2.88: UZBEKISTAN: AGGREGATE GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: uzbekistan, gender: male



1...work for wages, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment; 18<=age<=60 each yr.

Figure A2.89: UZBEKISTAN: STATE VS. PRIVATE SECTOR GROSS FLOWS

## labor market flows, country: uzbekistan, gender: male





Figure A2.90: UZBEKISTAN: HIGH VS. LOW SKILL OCCUPATION GROSS FLOWS

### labor market flows, country: uzbekistan, gender: male



1c...high-skill employment, 1d...low- or medium-skill employment, 2...self-employment, 3...nonemployment, 18<=age<=60 each yr.