МАГИСТЕРСКАЯ ДИССЕРТАЦИЯ

MASTER THESIS

Тема: Использовала ли верховная власть карьерные стимулы по отношению к губернаторам в Российской Империи (1895 – 1914)?

Title: Did the central authorities apply career incentives with respect to provincial governors in the Russian Empire (1895 -1914)?

Студент/ Student:

Кофанов Д.А. / Dmitry Kofanov
(Ф.И.О. студента, выполнившего работу)

Научный руководитель/ Advisor:

Евгений Яковлев, Ирина Денисова
Evgeny Yakovlev, Irina Denisova
(ученая степень, звание, место работы, Ф.И.О.)

Оценка/ Grade:

_____

Подпись/ Signature:

_____

Москва 2013

Did the central authorities apply career incentives with respect to provincial governors in the Russian Empire (1895 - 1914)?

Dmitry Kofanov, New Economic School MAE 2013, Russia

Abstract

The functioning of a hierarchy depends on the incentives which it creates for its members. Existing empirical studies show that career concerns and yardstick competition may be employed as a tool to improve efficiency of a hierarchy (in the sense of achieving certain purposes). In this paper I want to answer the question whether the authorities of the Russian Empire used career concerns to improve efficiency of provincial governance, mainly in the sphere of order and security. I have constructed a database which includes individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors (more than three hundred individuals) in 91 *gubernias* during the years 1895 - 1914. I measure the efficiency of a governor's performance with the intensity of peasant revolts and worker strikes in the region under his rule. I also try to estimate the influence of connections, administrative status of regions and the period on the governors' careers. Personal characteristics and a number of regional economic and social indicators are among the controls. My main result is that the central administration created career concerns for the governors only in the *oblasts*, but not in regular *gubernias*. I have not been able to find explicit econometric evidence of the positive influence of connections on the governors' promotions, yet, it cannot be rejected neither.

Contents

1 Introduction

Career concerns may be an important factor determining the efficiency of the political hierarchy. The argument that the managers' career concerns, working through the link of "today's performance to future wages", can create incentives for better performance was first formalized in Holmström 1982. Since then a number of empirical studies has shown that punishing of rewarding regional leaders with future appointments depending on the economic performance of their regions may be used to encourage these leaders to work more efficiently. For example, Li, Zhou 2005 show that in the post-Maoist China the promotion of provincial leaders hinged upon the economic growth of the province governed by them. Markevich, Zhuravskaya 2011 provide evidence that a similar approach to regional governance was employed by the Soviet central authorities during the Khrushchev's *"Sovnarkhos"* reform. Moreover, they show that it was really beneficial for regional economic growth under certain circumstances. The paper Jia, Kudamatsu, Seim 2013 refines the previous conclusions about the political system in the modern China, showing that economic growth and personal connections complement each other as factors of the regional governors' promotion.

Although in the empirical literature on career concerns the efficiency is usually understood in terms of economic performance, it may be expected that criteria of efficiency may depend on the specifics of the time and place, and on the purposes of the central administration. In this paper I am considering the case of the Russian provincial governors (*"gubernatori"*) in the last decades of the Tsarist Russia, namely in the period from 1895 to 1914. The purpose of this paper is to find out

whether the governors' career concerns were exploited by the central power in the pre-revolutionary Russia. I suppose that the main parameter of interest for the Tsarist regime was the political stability, peace and order in the regions, rather than the economic growth, which might also have been appreciated, but was not so important for the regime's survival and could not be managed by the governors to the same extent. Alternatively, basing on the historical literature, we may think about the great importance of connections in shaping the careers in this sphere. Different personal or regional characteristics could also play their role.

The period has been chosen both because of data availability and the fact that it covers the reign of Nicolas II since the beginning and up to World War I, which may give additional consistency to the patterns of governors' promotions and demotions. The research question has historical importance, because it relates to the causes of the Empire's collapse. If the central government failed to use career concerns, not rewarding or punishing governors depending on their provision of peace in *gubernias*, they could have governed their *gubernias* in a slipshod manner, poorly preventing the spread of revolutionary movement. The question also has a political-economic relevance, because the Russian Empire provides an interesting example of a political hierarchy in a traditional agrarian society.

Using two-way fixed effect OLS estimation, I show that it is possible to talk about career concerns exploitation only for the part of the regions. The provinces where the career incentives might have been created were the so-called *oblasts* which were usually newly acquired peripheral, economically and socially backward regions where the heads of administration (called military governors) combined both civil

and military powers. On the contrary, in the *gubernias*, regions with regular Imperial administration the relation between the intensity of disturbances and the governors' subsequent careers is either non-existent or (especially in case of worker strikes) paradoxically positive. The influence of disturbances in *oblasts* on the careers of their heads was rather large in magnitude: increasing of the logarithm of the number of peasant revolts by one standard deviation more than doubled the chances for demotion in comparison with *gubernias*. Diminishing of the lognumber of peasant revolts in *oblasts* by the same amount more than tripled the chances for promotion relative to *gubernias*.

Being the part of a governorate-general might have alleviated the negative influence of the revolts on the careers. There seems to be no definite break during the revolution of 1905 - 1907.The proxies for connections (court title and previous work in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of War) were not found to have significant relationship with the governors' careers. Yet, these results do not reject the role of personal connections (widely emphasized in the literature), and finer measures of them are needed.

2   Historical Survey

The institution of provincial governorship in the Russian Empire has been studied by a number of researchers, but nevertheless the literature on this subject cannot be characterized as voluminous. There exists only one modern monograph about Russian governors (covering the period 1880 - 1914) by R. G. Robbins (Robbins 1987); several articles and parts of monographs can also be mentioned (notably, Mosse 1984, Zaionchkovskii 1978). The status and functions of provincial governors were chang-

ing during the Imperial period, and in the nineteenth century were shaped the main dualities and contradictions of their position as rulers of provinces. It is usually emphasized that the governor was the "tsar's viceroy" in a province, appointed directly by the emperor, and, at the same time, an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Zaionchkovskii 1978, p. 144, Robbins 1987, p. 4).

According to the *Svod Zakonov*, the main task of the governor was to guarantee the "inviolability of the supreme rights of the Monarchy, the benefit of the state and the universal, exact observance of laws, codes, Supreme edicts, decree of the Senate, and the authorities' orders"[1] (*Svod Zakonov*, Vol 2., cl. 270). Secondly, the law prescribes the governor "to protect everywhere the public peace, the security of everyone and all and the observance of the statutory regulations, order, and security laws" (Ibid.). It should be noted that the governor controlled the police and appointed the key police officers in the *gubernia*. Finally, the governor had to care for public health, provision of food and charity. The "control for the fast implementation of legal decrees and requests" was also within the governor's responsibility.

There is no need to give here a detailed historical sketch of the evolution of the governors' power. It suffices to say that prior to the Great Reforms of the 1860s the governors possessed a rather broad scope of administrative and judicial powers in their provinces. During the Reforms they (primarily those in the European Russia) lost their judicial power and became constrained by *zemstvos* in deciding on economic and social matters. They were also put under a stricter control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, thus loosing direct touch with the Tsar (Robbins 1987, pp. 16 -

---

[1]Here and elsewhere in the paper the translation of quotes directly taken from the sources in Russian is mine.

17). But soon (in 1866) followed the regulations augmenting the power of governors: the right of unannounced inspection of any provincial state body, the right not to approve any provincial official's appointment and to close any society, club, etc. on political grounds. In the next decades there was further widening of the governors' powers, especially during Alexander III's "counterreforms" (Zaionchkovskii 1978, pp. 211 - 212). Overall, the governors grew more influential in the spheres of security, finance and legislation. Yet, it may be argued that in practice the governors' power was seriously limited both by central authorities and local institutions, so that "the governorship remained a "charismatic" office" (Robbins 1987, p. 19).

The role of informal relations ("favoritism and patronage", as Robbins states it) and, on the whole, non-professional considerations in appointments of top officials in the Russian Empire has been stressed by many authors, and, as far as the particular institution of governorship is concerned, it was perceived by contemporaries and later researchers as very high (Blinov 1905, pp. 263 - 267, Zaionchkovskii 1978, pp. 210 - 211, Mosse 1984, pp. 233 - 235), or even exceptionally high[2](Lieven, 1984a, p. 209).

During the nineteenth century, the usual procedure was developed when the governors' appointments were approved by the tsar, but the selection of candidates was made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Robbins 1987, pp. 20 - 21). Despite "the absence of any order in the governors' appointments" in the legislation (Blinov 1905, p. 263), the Ministry was working on the increasing of the appointees' professional qualities and was elaborating formal criteria of selection, as shown in Robbins 1987.

First of all, a dramatic rise in the educational level of governors over the 19th

---

[2]P. L. Lobko, the member of the State Council (*"Gosudarstvennii Sovet"*) since 1898 and the State Controller in 1899 - 1905, "singled out gubernatorial appointments as, by the standards of the administration as a whole, notorious for their unsystematic nature and for the backstairs influences involved in them". (Lieven, 1984a, p. 209)

century cannot be ignored. Between 1853 and 1903 the share of governors with higher education rose from 19.2% to 65.9% (Zaionchkovskii 1978, pp. 214), although it somewhat decreased after 1905 (Robbins 1987, p. 32). Secondly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was trying to "breed" candidates, providing them with better knowledge of local affairs and greater experience of administrative work. By 1913 most of the governors had a lengthy experience (of about 15 years) of provincial service prior to getting their current office, and about 3/4 of them had held the office of vice-governor just before becoming governors (Robbins 1987, pp. 28 - 29, 34 - 36). The number of those who hold military office right before governorship became negligible by 1913 (Robbins 1987, p. 34), but after 1905 there occurred an increase in the share of governors with the military education (Robbins 1987, p. 33).

On the other hand, Mosse (Mosse 1984) criticizes the point of view that there was "professionalization" of the gubernatorial corps with the quality of appointees increasing. He talks about "the growing instability of the gubernatorial system" by the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, which expressed itself in the increasing frequency of the governors' replacement and decreasing importance of the "vice-gubernatorial 'apprenticeship'", accompanied by the increasing share of the military and *uezd* marshals of nobility among appointees. Evidence provided by him does not confirm the growth of the governors' quality in that period.[3]

Some important characteristics of governors did not change much during the 19th century. Virtually all of them were hereditary noblemen, and most of them had landed property (Zaionchkovskii 1978, p. 214, Robbins 1987, pp. 31 - 32). According

---

[3] "Prince S. D. Urusov, himself an ex-governor deputy minister of the interior, observed that early in 1907 'when the personnel of governors had been changed almost entirely, every competent person must admit that the change was greatly for the worse" (Mosse 1984, pp. 238 - 239).

to Robbins, 25 - 30% of governors in 1880 - 1914 had court titles, which may allude to the role of "favoritism and connections" in their appointment (Robbins 1987, p. 21).

In order to properly analyze factors of governors' careers, it is necessary to know about the administrative divisions of the Russian Empire. In the period considered in this paper the Russian Empire was divided into *"gubernias"* which were ruled by the governors (formerly called civil governors) and *"oblasts"* which were headed by military governors possessing both civil and military powers. In the works cited the institution of civil governorship is mainly analyzed, but in this paper I am using data both on *gubernias* and *oblasts*.

The *oblasts* partly covered the South of Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, Ural and Siberia. There were 21 *oblasts* in 1914. Most of the oblast were included in the broader administrative entities - governorates-general (*general-gubernatorstva*) and *namestnichestvo* (Civil Administration in 1881 - 1905) in case of Caucasus. The *oblasts* were usually placed in the periphery, but the periphery did not consist exclusively of *oblasts*. Most of the peripheral regions were covered by the system of governorate-generals, which in the period considered included, apart from the Central Asia and Siberia, all Finnish, Polish, three Ukrainian *gubernias* and the two capital cities. Overall, the peripheral regions were governed through a system of special statutes (*uchrezhdeniya* or *polozheniya*) which regulated administration in all *oblasts* and in part of *gubernias*. In fact, in 1913 the 49 *gubernias* of the European Russia had regular administration defined by *Obshchee Uchrezhdenie Gubernskoe*, and the administration in all the other regions was liable to special *uchrezhdeniya* or

polozheniya.[4]

As far as the territories assigned to *oblasts* and governorates-general are concerned, the final aim of the central administration was to integrate them into the regular system of Imperial governance which might have been hampered by local traditions, strategic reasons and other objective or subjective circumstances (see, for example, Abashin et al. 2008, pp. 103 - 104). The *oblasts* were considered to be temporary administrative units, although in practice their existence lasted for decades. In the Caucasus the inability of the fast introduction of "general Imperial laws" and the military resistance of the indigenous population led to the adoption of the so-called system of the "military-popular government" (*voenno-narodnoye upravlenie*) since the 1860s which was later used in the conquered Central Asia (Bobrovnikov et al. 2007, pp. 190 - 191, Abashin et al. 2008, p. 89). The essence of this system was the inseparability of the military and civil powers and "the preservation of the traditional institutions of self-governance under the control of the Russian administration" (Abashin et al. 2008, p. 89). Despite the measures towards the administrative unification with the rest of the Empire, the "military-popular government" which was more peculiar to *oblasts* lasted till 1917 (Bobrovnikov et al. 2007, pp. 203). In Siberia and Far East the the existence of *oblasts* was originally connected with "the simplicity of administrative tasks", indeed, the administrative system was more primitive than in *gubernias*. Yet, "the introduction of necessary institutions" was unduly delayed, because the central government was too inert in this respect and was unwilling to

_____

[4]`http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8_`
`%D0%B8_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%`
`D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B8_%D0%BF%`
`D0%BE_%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8E_%D0%BD%D0%B0_1914_`
`%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4`

incur additional expenses. (Damesheck et al. 2007, pp. 112, 126).

On the whole, it is possible to formulate several typical characteristics of the *oblasts* in the period studied: 1) the *oblasts* were usually peripheral regions often marked by social and economic backwardness concomitant with the high share of the non-Russian minorities. As administrative units they were usually much "younger" than *gubernias*; 2) they were ruled by the military governors who possessed both military and civil powers and were usually currently in the military service. They were usually appointed by the Emperor, and the candidates were chosen by the Ministry of Interior in coordination with the Ministry of War [5]; 3) the administrative apparatus of *oblasts* was on the whole more primitive and centralized than in *gubernias*, the military governor through the system of *oblastniye pravleniya* exercised wide powers in the spheres of law, police, public finance and economy, interaction with indigenous population. He could even control the spheres normally assigned to the central authorities, like fiscal revenues and expenses, which in *gubernias* were controlled by the local *kazenniye palati*, directly subordinate to the ministry of finance (for example, Eroshkin 1983, p. 249). The *zemstvos* were also absent in the *oblasts*; 4) basing on items 2) and 3), it may be inferred that the rulers of the *oblasts* were more powerful masters of the entrusted territories than the heads of the regular *gubernias*, but at the same time they were much more often subordinate to the general-governors (or the *glavnonachalstvuiushchyi grazhdanskoi chastiyu* in 1883 - 1905 and *namestnick* since 1905 in case of Caucasus).

The institution of the governorate-general was another important element of the

---

[5]In the period considered there was also one *gubernia* headed by the military governor - Kutais-skaya

Imperial system of the administration in the periphery (with the exception of the Moscow and Saint-Petersburg governorates-general). Each of them comprised of of several *gubernias* or *oblasts* and was ruled by general-governors (*general-gubernatori*), who, like military governors, also had both military and civil powers. Their powers were very wide, they could interfere into all spheres of administration in the *gubernias* and control the activities of governors. The establishment and preservation of governorates-general in Poland, Caucasus, Siberia could have been caused by military and political considerations such as proximity to potentially hostile states or (at least danger of) military resistance of the local population, sometimes by the necessity to coordinate economic and administrative activities between *gubernias* (Eroshkin 1983, p. 186; Damesheck et al. 2007, p. 142).

3   Hypotheses

The previous studies of the institution of the pre-revolutionary governorship in Russia usually addressed the problem of criteria for the selection of the persons to be appointed as governors. In this paper, following the methodology of Li, Zhou 2004 and Markevich, Zhuravskaya 2011, I am going to find out whether the efficiency of governance and personal characteristics could influence the subsequent careers of governors. These questions are indeed connected with each other. If there were no systematic pattern in governors' appointments, mainly driven by patronage and intrigues, it may be expected that the subsequent careers of governors were shaped in the same manner.[6]

---

[6]Indeed, as a pre-revolutionary author notes, "It should be acknowledged that another essential drawback of the law is the unsettledness of the further movements in office of the governors. Here also nothing firm, nothing determined can be found, - some of the governors are appointed members of the State Council, another ones - senators, the third ones - members of the Council of the Minister

My main hypothesis examined in this paper is that there existed criteria of regional performance which influenced further careers of governors. I suppose that the main criterion was the ability of governors to maintain peace and security in provinces. I use the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes in a certain year as a measure of unrest in a *gubernia* (or *oblast*). As it is stated in Robbins 1987: "Peace was the governor's profession. Among the many duties assigned to His Excellency, none was more central than the maintenance of law and public order. The *Svod Zakonov* listed numerous obligations: protecting the state against its enemies, preserving the security of the tsar's subjects from attacks by thieves, swindlers, and bandit gangs, suppressing civil disturbances, and upholding public morality." (Robbins 1987, p. 180).

The police function of the governors were described in the *Svod Zakonov* in much detail (*Svod Zakonov*, Vol 2., cl. 314-320). As it was mentioned above, the governor commanded the local police. He also had to closely interact with the local troops for the suppression of disturbances. If there emerged a need in using troops, the governor asked the commander of the local garrison to provide soldiers, and then took command of them before the use of weapons grew necessary. In the latter case the command of the troops was again transferred to the military officer. In practice, the governors sometimes had to travel with troops around the *gubernia* in order to pacify the rebellious peasants, or, at least, they made sporadic expeditions in relatively peaceful times. In the same way, often with the personal presence in the place of disturbances, they had to deal with workers on strike.

---

of Internal Affairs, the fourth ones - honorary guardians of Empress Maria's institutions..., and so forth, while an impartial observer almost never can understand why one person got more and another person got less flattering appointment." (Blinov 1905, p. 266)

Indeed, it is possible to name a number of cases when the ability of governors to manage the political situation in a *gubernia* influenced their further appointment. Perhaps, the most famous was the case of Pyotr Stolypin who was successful in coping with the unrest in Saratov *gubernia*, and afterwards was made Minister of Interior and Chairman of Council of Ministers in 1906. Among other examples it is possible to mention Vladimir Launitz who got the position of the mayor of Saint-Petersburg after his pacification of Tambov *gubernia* in 1905. The Kharkov governor (1902 - 1903) Ivan Obolensky vigorously suppressed peasant unrest flogging peasants all over the *gubernia*, and these actions, endorsed by Pleve, the then Minister of Interior, brought him the position of the Finland governor-general (Witte 1911, vol I, Ch. 16, `http://az.lib.ru/w/witte_s_j/text_0050.shtml`). Nevertheless, he had to wait about a year for this appointment being attached the Ministry of Interior.

There is evidence that the leadership of the Ministry of Interior needed the governors who could resolutely suppress the unrest (but it seems that sometimes the readiness of the person to employ most harsh measures was confused with his efficiency as peacemaker (see Witte 1911, Vol. 2, Ch. 42, `http://az.lib.ru/w/witte_s_j/text_0060.shtml`). Ivan Koshko, the Penza and later Perm governor, writes in his memoirs that when he was the vice-governor in Samara, the then prime-minister Stolypin in a private talk thanked him for his correct behavior in the "difficult circumstances", that is, revolutionary turmoil, and promised to make him governor (this promise was later fulfilled) (Koshko 1916, pp. 125 - 126).[7]

The governors who were not persistent enough in fighting revolution could lose

---

[7]Koshko also mentions Mikhail Shramchenko, who, being the member of the *gubernskoe prisutstvie* in Chernigov *gubernia*, successfully struggled with agrarian revolts traveling with the troops across the *gubernia*, and was appointed the vice-governor of Bessarabia (Koshko 1916, pp. 129-130). Later he became governor in Nizhniy Novgorod.

their office. Koshko writes that Pyotr Durnovo, the Minister of Interior in 1905-1906, demanded from the governors the most resolute measures against disturbances, and "several infirm governors had already been deposed" (Koshko 1916, p. 16). The Tomsk governor Azanchevskiy-Azancheev after *pogrom* in Tomsk, "accompanied by the fire in the theater and numerous deaths" was dismissed and later was not able to resume his service (Urusov 1907, Ch. 13). Alexei Lopukhin, the head of Estliand gubernia, was reposed in 1905 because he was suspected of the "too liberal" approach towards the revolutionaries (Witte Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 36). He was attached to the Ministry of Interior and later dismissed from the Ministry due to his critique of the police. Vikentiy Raaben lost his office of the Bessarabia governor in 1903 because of his indecisiveness during the Jewish *pogrom* in Kishinev (Urusov 1907, Ch. 2). Ivan Kholshcevnikov, the military governor of Zabaikalskaya *oblast* in 1906 was dismissed and sentenced to prison because of his arguable lenience to the revolutionary movement.[8]

Another hypothesis (not necessarily contradicting the first one) is that favoritism and patronage remained important in the shaping of governors' careers. It has already been mentioned that the prominent role of connections in the governors' appointments in the Russian Empire was a commonplace for contemporaries. As an example, "irresoluteness" arguably led to the dismissal of the Samara governor (1904-1905) Dmitry Zasyadko (Koshko 1916, p. 37) and the Minsk governor (1905-1906) Pavel Kurlov (Witte 1911, Vol 2., Ch. 51 `http://az.lib.ru/w/witte_s_j/text_0070.shtml`), but their connections (along with political affiliation in case of Kurlov) let them continue their career: Zasyadko soon became governor in another *gubernia*,

---

[8]`http://bsk.nios.ru/enciklodediya/holshchevnikov-ivan-vasilevich`

and Pavel Kurlov was made member of the Council of the Minister of Interior and later became deputy Minister. I test this hypothesis using proxies for connections: having court title and previous work in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of war.

Another hypothesis is that the administrative status on the region could influence the possibility of the governors' promotions and demotions. As it has been described in detail above, in *oblasts*, unlike *gubernias*, the governors had both civil and military powers, and on the whole their credentials were much wider. The economic, social and political situation in *oblasts* also differed from that in *gubernias*. It is possible to suggest that this differences in powers and local specifics might lead to differences in the levels of responsibility for the situation in the region, and on the whole the future career. Therefore I use dummy for *oblasts* in my estimation. A similar argument justifies the use of the dummy for being part of a governorate-general: governor-generals were an additional instance between the governor and the central authorities, could determine the policies in the subordinate *gubernias* and control the governors' activities. The primarily borderline location of governorate-generals (as well as *oblasts*) with all its political repercussions also might have been important.

The last hypothesis to test is the role of the revolution of 1905-1907 which might have made more indispensable a governors' ability to cope with disturbances. So, after 1905 the tsarist administration may have become more sensitive to the ability of governors to promote peace and security, and punished or rewarded them with future appointments. Indeed, it has been noted that "to some extent the events of 1905 - 1906 shocked the monarch and his advisers into appointing much younger and more

vigorous men to key posts" (Lieven 1984a, p. 218). Some changes in the characteristics of the gubernatorial corpus after 1905 have been mentioned above. Robbins argues that after 1905 the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to choose as governors persons with better knowledge of local conditions and peasants' problems, and paid more attention to their political views. By 1906 the Ministry started to systematically evaluate "the moral and the service qualifications of candidates" (Robbins 1987, pp. 29 - 30). Although the aforesaid directly refers to gubernatorial appointments, and not to the fate of former governors, the creation of career concerns might have been a logical step for the authorities wishing to increase the efficiency of governors.

4 Data

I have constructed the database containing personal characteristics of more than 300 governors and their pre- and post-gubernatorial appointments in years 1895 - 1914. I primarily used online sources (typically several sources for a governor), and the full list of them would not be included in this paper because it is too long (the list can be provided on demand). I would like to mention the internet-encyclopedias of which I made use most heavily: Wikipedia (`www.wikipedia.ru`), *Russkaya armia v Velikoi voine* (`www.grwar.ru`), *Istoriya Russkoi Imperatorskoy armii* (`regiment.ru`). The data on the periods of governors' rule in gubernias are taken from Samokhvalov 2003, Wikipedia articles on gubernias and biographical sources.

The data on peasant revolts were constructed on the basis of several collection of documents. The sources of these data and the methodology of counting are described in detail in the Appendix. The data on the number of worker strikes are taken from Varzar 1905, 1908, 1910 for years 1895 - 1908, and directly from *Svod otchetov*

fabrichnih inspektorov for years 1909 - 1913. Overall, I have numbers of worker strikes in 65 gubernias where the Fabric Inspection was present for years 1895 - 1913. The Fabric Inspection covered not all but the majority of manufacturing enterprizes and workers in these gubernias. The data on the grain yield were taken from Obukhov 1927. The data on horses and cows in each gubernia were kindly provided by Andrei Markevich.

The coding of the governors' appointments is presented in the Table 3. It may seem arguable, because it is not always clear which position can be considered higher, lower than or standing at the same level as the position of a provincial governor. Nevertheless, I have decided to stay on this variant. First I place some remarks on what can be considered promotion. Since Nicolas I there existed a system of correspondence between "classes" (*klass*) of officials' ranks (*chin*) according to the Table of Ranks and the "classes" of positions that could be occupied by them. (Lieven 1984a, pp. 205 - 207).[9] Generally, for top officials working in Saint Petersburg "the pay, conditions of service, and career prospects... were far better" than for those who worked in the provinces (Lieven 1984b, p. 435). Anecdotal evidence says that an ambitious official would prefer to stay in Petersburg rather than hold the office of the same class in the province.[10]

It often happened that former governors were transferred to Petersburg, but the

---

[9]Apart from the role of favoritism, another major criticism of the system of officials' appointments in the Russian Empire has been directed to the cumbersome rank (*chin*) system. "In particular, automatic promotion in rank and the legal requirement of senior rank for candidates for political office has at times been seen as breeding a spirit of routine and mediocrity in the government class" (Lieven 1984a, p. 206). But in practice the system was rather flexible "because numerous exemptions and loopholes made... [the regulations] dead letter" (Ibid., p. 207).

[10]Lieven considers the case of A. N. Mosolov who finally became a member of the State Council: "Transfer to provincial service [after being head of Department of Foreign Faiths] was, however, rightly seen by Mosolov as a near fatal blow to his ambitions, his vanity and to his desire one day to play a key role in formulating governmental policy" (Lieven 1984a, p. 213).

status of such transfer is not always clear. It is obvious, for example, that the minister or deputy minister is a higher position than the governor. It is also reasonable to consider granting a membership in such institution as the State Council as promotion.[11]. The situation with the Senate is less clear. On the whole, it does not seem much less prestigious than the State Council. The membership in the State Council was popularly perceived as a "sinecure", and becoming a senator - in some cases as an "honorable resignation" (Zaionchkovskii 1978, pp. 196, 203 - 204). At the same time, such body as the Council of the Minister of Internal Affairs "was generally the last resting ground for the failed official" (Lieven 1984a, p. 213).

As a variant, it is possible to use some formal criteria for the ranking of offices. First of all, we may turn to the mentioned system of the "classes" (*klassi*), assigned to different offices.[12]. In this system the office of Minister, Deputy Minister, membership in State Council, Senate and even the position of an honorary guardian had higher classes than the governor's office. The positions of the head of a ministerial department had the same class as the governor (4th class corresponding to the *chin* of *deistvitelnyi statskyi sovetnik*). As far as the military offices are concerned, the class of the governor's office was the same as the class of the brigade commander; the commanders of divisions, corps, armies, military districts formally had higher

---

[11]For instance, for the mentioned A. N. Mosolov the appointment to the State Council from the position of head of Department of Foreign Faiths (which he hold for the second time, and which itself was preferable to governorship), clearly was a promotion (Lieven, 1984a, p. 214). Lieven names the State Council "formally the highest and probably the most prestigious institution in nineteenth-century Russia" (Ibid., p. 200). The membership in the State Council was particularly aspired by top officials because of the exceptionally high pensions paid to former State Council members (Ibid., p. 218).

[12]In stating correspondence between classes and offices I used the "Table of Ranks" from `http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1700dok/tabel_end.php`. I did not find direct indication of the class of the member of the Ministerial Council, nevertheless I consider it the same as the class of a department's head and, correspondingly, governor. I make this conclusion from the fact that the Ministerial Council consisted of the heads of departments and appointed members, so that their position might have been formally equal

classes than the governor.

Nevertheless, this formal criterion does not seem to be fully satisfactory for several reasons. First, despite the traditional militarization of the Imperial system of governance and the prestige of the military service, it seems highly unlikely that a person who commanded a brigade (half of the division) and a person who governed the *gubernia* (with population up to several millions people) could be equalized in their status.[13] Secondly, as has been mentioned above, the positions in the Saint-Petersburg might have been more attractive than the provincial positions of the same class because of different career prospects. Thirdly, to measure the real relative status of different positions, it might be instructive to look at their salaries, as the the offices with equal classes might have differ a lot with respect to material gains.

According to the figures provided in Zaionchkovskii 1998, in the early 1900s the governors were paid from 9600 to 12620 rubles per year, whereas the division commander, for example, got only 6000 rubles per year, and only the corps commanders (2 classes higher than the governors) were given salaries comparable to those of the governors (9300 rubles per year). As far as the civil office is concerned, the yearly salary of the head of a department in the Ministry of Interior in 1903 was roughly 7000 rubles (with the apartment provided by state), the Deputy Minister of Interior got 15000 rubles per year (Zaionchkovskii 1978, pp. 87 - 88). In 1902 the basic salary of the members of the State Council was from 12000 to 18000 rubles per year (the total benefits could exceed 20000 rubles). The senators even in 1878 were paid 7000 - 10500 rubles per year which generally exceeded the salaries of governors in that

---

[13]On the falling popularity of the military service in comparison with the civil service for the nobility, and the poor financial position of the military in the studied period see Zaionchkovskii 1998

period (5000 - 8000 rubles in 1884) (Ibid., pp. 86 - 87). Since that time the salaries of all officials had risen and the differentials must have been preserved.

Nevertheless, the ranging of offices according only to the official salaries does not seem reasonable for my purposes because of several considerations. Firstly, not only salaries, but also expenses for different positions differed much. For example, the governors had to incur high representative expenses, in particular regular social functions (see, for example Koshko 1916, pp. 172, 202), which was not characteristic of other civil and military official of the same and even higher ranks. Secondly, ideally it would be relevant to consider the relative attractiveness of offices from the perspective of rent-seeking possibilities. Provincial governors might have been heavily involved in bribery and embezzlement, so that their incomes might have been rather high even in comparison with those who worked in the central administration. Unfortunately, I do not have enough information to make such comparison. Thirdly, for the governors (especially the elderly one), who could not hope for the continuation of their career, the alternative to becoming a senator of a member of the State Council with high salary and then pension, and certain political and administrative influence, was a rather dreary existence in retirement, especially for those with meager own funds.[14]

With all these considerations in mind, I have constructed the version of coding given in Table 3. I have tried to take into account all available characteristics of an office when attributing to it one of three values.

---

[14]Saltykov-Schedrin in *Pompadours and Pompadouresses* describes the unenviable fate of a retired governor who missed to become a senator: "He left everything that was dear to his heart, and left not in order to decorate by himself one of the halls of the magnificent building with the windows overlooking the Senate Square, but in order to join the ranks of those murmuring and vainly hoping, who in these days somewhat peculiarly overcrowd the squares and streets of Petersburg". `http://az.lib.ru/s/saltykow_m_e/text_0020.shtml`

The summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. On average a governor in 1895 - 1914 was 52 years old (variable *age*, had been in office for 4.7 years, their average class according to the Table of Ranks was slightly higher than 4 (variable *rank*). Almost all of the governors were hereditary nobles (dummy variable *herednobility*), orthodox (*religion* is the dummy variable for orthodox religion), about 64% of them possessed higher education (dummy variable *educ*), and about one third had court title (dummy variable *court*). These figures almost coincide with those given in Zaionchkovskii 1978 and Robbins 1987. It should be reminded that the sample used in this paper is wider because of the inclusion of military governors which ruled in *oblasts*. About 32% of them were current military (variable *military*), and half that percentage - former military (variable *formermilitary*). About 14% were titled noblemen.

In Table 1 the variables are averaged both in *gubernias* and years, perhaps, it would be more instructional to take averages at several dates. The conclusions that can be inferred from Table 2 are quite consistent with those made in Robbins 1987. After the revolution of 1905 - 1907 the educational level of the governors somewhat decreased, and the number of governors with the military background increased, arguably because the governors' ability to cope with disturbances grew more valuable in the eyes of the central authorities.

5 Estimation Results

I make OLS estimation of the two-way fixed effect panel model, which has the following generalized form [15]:

$$c_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \beta X_{it} + \gamma P_{it} + \delta X_{it} D_{it} + \varphi C_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

In this equation c_{it} is the career variable, X_{it} is a vector of logs of peasant and worker disturbances[16], P_{it} are the two dummies for personal connections, D_{it} is the set of dummies including P_{it}, two dummies for being an *oblast* or part of the governorate-general, and the post-1905 dummy; C_{it} is the vector of controls, including personal characteristics and social and economic indicators of *gubernias*. α_i and λ_t stand for fixed region and time effects, respectively.

The results of the estimation are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 6 I provide estimation of the same equations as in Table 5, only adding the grain yield growth as additional controls. The reason for the inclusion of the latter variable is an attempt to address possible endogeneity: for example, bad harvests might have both intensify peasant disturbances and worsen the governor's career prospects. The estimation with the inclusion of the number of horses and cows (the output is not provided here) does not much change the results.

It is important to note that some important variables of interest cover different numbers of regions, therefore adding or excluding them may change our sample in a non-random way. In particular, the data for worker strikes cover only 65 regions out of 91 in the general sample (including only 4 *oblasts* out of 19 in the sample). The

---

[15]I have chosen OLS estimation rather than ordered probit or logit because it lets to avoid incidental parameters problem when inconsistent estimates of fixed effects may lead to the inconsistent estimation of other coefficients

[16]In order to deal with zeros I took logarithms after adding one to the number of disturbances.

data for grain yield refer only to 50 European regions: 49 *gubernias* and 1 *oblast*. The estimation without time or region fixed effects does not essentially change the results.

The main result is that career concerns with respect to governors might have existed only in *oblasts*. In the Table 5 the coefficients at the interactions of peasant revolts with the dummy for *oblasts* are everywhere negative and significant. This effect is economically also highly significant. Increasing of the logarithm of the number of peasant revolts in an *oblast* by one standard deviation (1.071) more than doubled the chances for demotion the same year in comparison with *gubernias*. Diminishing of the logarithm of the number of peasant revolts in *oblasts* by the same amount more than tripled the chances for promotion relative to *gubernias*.[17]. Similar coefficients can be seen at the interactions of the dummy for *oblasts* with worker strikes, but, as it has been noted, this estimation used data only for 4 *oblasts*. In Table 6 the coefficients at interactions with *oblasts* are even less meaningful as only one *oblast* is present in the sample (yet, they are much like those in Table 5). As far as the other variables are concerned, the results provided in Table 6 are much alike those we get when including all regions.

This result confirms the hypothesis that the *oblast* status could influence future careers of the governors. The specifics of administration in *oblasts* has already been described. It is possible to assume that wider responsibilities of the military governors (who directly commanded the local troops) and arguably more tense political situation in the *oblasts* (which had been established as administrative units relatively

---

[17]The coefficients at *oblast*log(1+peasant revolts)* vary from -0.141 to -0.170 in Table 5, the empirical unconditional probabilities of promotions is 0.0403 and of demotions 0.0678 (see Table 4). Coefficients at logs of peasant revolts are small and insignificant.

recently and sometimes as a result of conquest) might have made central authorities more sensitive to the governors' ability to maintain peace and security. The result for the governorates-general is somewhat less stable between specifications, all significant interactions with revolts and strikes are positive. It might contradict the usually peripheral and thus strategically important position of the governorates-general, on the other hand, wide powers of the governors-general might have limited personal responsibility of the governors. It should be reminded that most of the *oblasts* were parts of governorates-general, but the positive coefficients at the interactions with the latter are far from being high enough to offset the negative influence of *oblasts*.

In case of *gubernias* as opposed to *oblasts* there is no sign of career concerns. The coefficients at the peasant revolts are everywhere insignificant, the coefficients at worker strikes are surprisingly positive and significant when we do not include data on grain yield in the equation (in the latter case they are still positive but not significant). It is not easy to explain this result. It might have been that the growing unrest could lead to the dismissal of the governor but (perhaps, because of some unobservable factors) not necessarily his demotion.[18] Alternatively, if we assume the existence of career concerns, we may think that the cessation of any disturbances was inevitable, thus their emergence was just a chance for the governor to show off himself and earn promotion. Yet, such an explanation questions the relevance of the data on disturbances used in the estimation as measures of unrest in *gubernias*.

It may be the case that differences in some personal characteristics of the governors could lead to such differences in career determination between *oblasts* and

---

[18]For instance, Robbins writes about "the MVD's persistent inability or even unwillingness to weed out the unworthy in the gubernatorial ranks.

gubernias. The military governors usually stayed in the military service (which is not surprising, given the concentration in their hands of both military and civil powers), and the ordinary governors were civil officials. Table 7 shows that, indeed, 87% of leaders in *oblasts* and only 18% in *gubernias* were the military, and it makes the most important distinction between the two groups. Could the results of the estimation be ascribed to some specifics of career patterns in the Army?

In Table 8 I make the same estimation as in Table 5, except for adding interactions of peasant revolts and worker strikes with the *military* dummy. It can be seen that interactions with *oblasts* loose somewhat in their magnitude and significance, the effects of the interactions with the *military* dummy are negative and almost everywhere insignificant. The exclusion of the *oblast* dummy and interactions with it (see Table 9) increases the size of the coefficients at interactions with the *military* dummy and makes them significant in most cases. On the whole, it seems that certain superimposition of these two effects may be present but the effect of *oblasts* is much more significant and large in magnitude. This evidence do not contradict the previous conclusions about the influence of the *oblast* status combined with the intensity of disturbances on the governors' careers, but suggests that the magnitude of this influence might have been more modest.

Another possible criticism may refer to the construction of the dependent variable which may overvalue or undervalue the status of some promotions. I have tried to introduce some changes (the new variable is called *career2*): namely, I lowered the status of some military offices (chiefs of staff and logistics, previously promotions, and membership in the Military council were considered as lateral transfers, the

office of a corps commander became demotion), and raised the status of some civil ones (membership in the Council of the Minister of Interior and Consultation of the Ministry of Justice, becoming aide of a governor-general were considered lateral transfers). From Table 11 it can be seen, that the the coefficients are overall similar, and interactions of interest have the same sign and somewhat smaller magnitude in case of peasant revolts. I also tried the variant where the senator's office is a lateral transfer, but the results (not provided here) are similar.

I have not been able to find positive influence of connections on the governors' promotion. The coefficients at the interaction of the court title dummy with worker strikes are surprisingly negative, which questions the *court* as a reasonable proxy. Of course, this result does not wholly exclude the role of connections: the proxies used are very imperfect, and additional work is needed to capture the presence of connections (again, low R^2s in the regressions tell about the existence of the plenty of unobservable factors). The presence of connections is very elusive and hard to formalize as it can take many shapes. I also have not found the significant influence of the post-1905 period on the patterns of the governors' promotions and demotions.

6   Conclusion

This paper shows that the central authorities of the Russian Empire might have employed career concerns in the promotions and demotions of provincial governors, encouraging them to cope with peasant and worker disturbances, but only in some regions, covering the lesser part of the territory and population. Those regions were called *oblasts* and, in contrast to *gubernias*, they were marked by the concentration of both civil and military powers in the hands of the governors, relatively recent date of

establishment, peripheral geographical position, in many cases economic and social backwardness along with the high share of the non-Russian minorities. This peculiar position of *oblasts* might have led to the greater responsibility of the governors for the situation in *oblasts* and stronger concern of the central authorities about the disturbances, than in *gubernias*. The magnitude of the effect in *oblasts* was rather large: an increase of the logarithm of peasant revolt by one standard deviation more than doubled the chances for demotion, and its decrease by the same amount tripled the chances for promotion.

The change of the pattern of the governors' promotions and demotions after 1905 has not been confirmed. I have also not been able to find econometric evidence of the role of connections proxied by the possession of a court title and previous service in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of War in the governors' subsequent careers. Yet, it does not mean that the factor of connections, widely referred to in the historical literature, can be comfortably disposed of, because the used proxies are rather imperfect, and we need finer ones.

7 References

Abashin S. N. et al. (eds.) (2008) *Tsentralnaya Aziya v sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow, Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye

Blinov I. A. (1905) *Gubernatori. Istoriko-iuridicheskii ocherk*, St. Petersburg

Bobrovnikov V. O. et al. (eds.) (2007) *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow, Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye

Damesheck I. L. et al. (eds.) (2007) *Sibir v sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow, Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye

Eroshkin N. P. (1983) *Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevolutsionnoi Rossii*, Moscow, Vysshaya Shkola, 3rd ed.

Holmström B. (1982) *Managerial incentives problems Ũ A dynamic perspective* in *Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck*, Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics; reprinted in Review of Economics Studies 66 (1999), pp. 169-82.

Jia R., Kudamatsu M., Seim D. (2013) *Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China*, IIES, Stockholm University Working Paper

Koshko I. F. (1916) *Vospominaniia gubernatora (1905 - 1914 g.). Novgorod-Samara-Penza*, Petrograd

Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, various volumes (1890 - 1900, 1901 - 1904, June 1907 - July 1914), Moscow, 1959 - 1998

Li H., Zhou L.-A. (2005) *Political turnover an economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China*, Journal of Public Economics 89, pp. 1743-1762

Lieven D. (1984a) *Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II. Careers and Mentalities*, Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 32, H. 2, pp. 199-223

Lieven D. (1984b) *The Russian ruling elite under Nicholas II*, Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique, Vol. 25 No. 4, Octobre-Decembre, pp. 429-454

Markevich A., Zhuravskaya E. (2011) *M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia*, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pp. 1550-1560

Mosse W. E. (1984) *Russian Provincial Governors at the End of the Nineteenth Cen-*

tury, The Historical Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Mar., pp. 225 - 239

Obukhov V. M. (1927) *Dvizheniie urozhaev zernovykh kultur v Evropeiskoi Rossii v period 1883 - 1915 gg.*, Moscow, `http://istmat.info/node/21585`

Revoliutsiya 1905 - 1907 gg. v Rossii. Dokumenti i materiali. 50 let 1905 - 1955, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955 - 1965

Robbins R. G. (1987) *The Tsar's Viceroys. Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire*, Cornell University Press

Saltykov-Schedrin M. E. (1874) *Pompaduri i Pompadurshi*, `http://az.lib.ru/s/saltykow_m_e/text_0020.shtml`

Samokhvalov N. F. et al. (eds.) (2003) *Gubernii Rossiiskoi Imperii. Istoriya i rukovoditeli 1708 - 1917*, Moscow, MVD

Svod otchetov fabrichnih inspektorov for various years (1909 - 1913), SPb, 1911 - 1914

Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Vol. 2, izd. 1892 goda, `http://civil.consultant.ru/reprint/books/172/`

Tabel o rangakh (po sostoyaniiyu na 2-yu pol. XIX - nachalo XX veka), `http:`

//www.hrono.ru/dokum/1700dok/tabel_end.php

Urusov S. D. (1907) *Zapiski Gubernatora. Kishinev 1903 - 1904 g.*, Moscow, `http://az.lib.ru/u/urusow_s_d/text_0020.shtml`

Varzar V. E. (1908) *Statistika stachek rabochih na fabrikah i zavodah za 1905 god*, SPb

Varzar V. E. (1910) *Statistika stachek rabochih na fabrikah i zavodah za trehletie 1906 - 1908 gg.*, SPb

Varzar V. E. (1905) *Statisticheskie svedenia o stachkah rabochih na fabrikah i zavodah za desyatiletie 1895 - 1904 goda*, SPb

Witte S. Yu. (1911) *Vospominaniya. Tsarstvovanie Nicolaya II*, `http://az.lib.ru/w/witte_s_j/`

Zaionchkovskii P. A. (1998) *Russkii ofitzerskii korpus nakanune Pervoi Mirovoi Voini* in *P. A. Zaionchkovskii (1904-1983 gg.): Statji, publikatzii, vospominaniya o nem*, Moscow, ROSSPEN, `http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/8.htm`

Zaionchkovskii P. A. (1978) *Pravitelstvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.*, Moscow

Appendix. Description of the data on peasant revolts

1. Data on the number of peasant revolts for years 1895 - 1904 and June 1907 - July 1914 were constructed using the following collections of documents: A. V. Shapkarin (ed.) *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii in 1890 - 1900*, Moscow, 1959; A. M. Anfimov (ed.) *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii in 1901 - 1904*, Moscow, 1998; A. V. Shapkarin (ed.) *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii: June 1907 - July 1914*, Moscow, 1966. I used the chronicles of the peasant movement placed in the end of each volume and counted all mentioned cases of unrest except for the dissemination of leaflets. For years 1901 - 1904 I took data directly from the table in A. M. Anfimov (ed.) *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii in 1901 - 1904*, Moscow, 1998, pp. 311 - 313. Thus the methodology of the counting of the number of peasant revolts for these years may differ from the one I used for other years, but it is unlikely that the divergence is significant and may seriously influence the results.

2. Data on the number of peasant revolts for 1905 - June 1907 were constructed on the basis of the collection of documents in 18 volumes: *Revoliutsiya 1905 - 1907 gg. v Rossii. Dokumenti i materiali. 50 let 1905 - 1955*, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955 - 1965.

    (a) Cases of arson, damage by cattle, illegal tree cutting and plowing were as a rule counted by the number of involved estates. When the peasants of several villages participated in an act, I considered it a single case. The repeated accidents in an estate over a short period were considered a single episode. The full destruction of an estate (or a rich peasant's

farm) was also counted as a single episode. Peasants' armed clashes with the troops, policemen or *"strazhniks"* (who arrived, for example, to stop illegal actions) were taken for separate episodes.

(b) Agrarian workers' strikes (which were frequent in the Western gubernias) were counted by the numbers of *folwarks* which went on strike. I also counted the cases of violent expulsion of workers by peasants.

(c) I separately counted the cases of illegal propaganda (if the agitator gathered a peasants' meeting); resolutions (*"prigovori"*) of peasants' meetings (*"skhodi"*) addressed to the authorities and containing political and economic requirements; processions and demonstrations with banners; laying economic claims to landlords by peasants (if accompanied by threats).

(d) I also counted the episodes of illegal deposition and reelection of the local administration, refusals to pay taxes, clashes with the troops, having arrived for the restoration of order, attacks on the police or troops in order to release prisoners.

(e) In the late 1905 - early 1906 there were armed rebellions in Kurliandskaya, Lifliandskaya, Estliandskaya and Kutaisskaya gubernias. I counted different episodes of resistance to the authorities, although sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between peasant and other kinds of disturbances.

(f) In case there was reported that the revolts had swept over the whole gubernia, but there was no detailed information, I took it as a single case. Nevertheless, if some particular revolts were mentioned, I counted them separately.

Table 1: Summary of Variables

VARIABLES	description	N	mean	sd	min	max
career	1 - promotion, 0 - same level, -1 - demotion	1,712	-0.028	0.328	-1	1
age	age in years	1,639	51.963	7.005	34	72
tenure	number of years in the current office (governorship)	1,770	4.718	3.659	1	20
court	court title: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,771	0.326	0.469	0	1
centralapp	previous work in the central apparatus of MVD or War Ministry: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1465	0.202	0.402	0	1
rank	rank according to the Table of Ranks	1,763	3.788	0.725	2	7
title	noble title: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,771	0.141	0.348	0	1
educ	higher education: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,458	0.644	0.479	0	1
herednobility	hereditary nobleman: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,544	0.978	0.147	0	1
religion	non-orthodox: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,719	0.0733	0.261	0	1
military	currently in the military service: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,768	0.321	0.467	0	1
formermilitary	formerly in the military service: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1,429	0.162	0.368	0	1
log(1+peasant revolts)	log(1+number of peasant revolts)	1,771	0.746	1.071	0	5.961
log(1+worker strikes)	log(1+number of worker strikes)	1,264	1.197	1.504	0	7.748
oblast	oblast: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1771	0.210	0.407	0	1
govgen	governorate-general: 1 - yes, 0 - no	1788	0.305	0.461	0	1
lnruralpop	log of rural population	1,759	6.966	0.876	3.270	8.337
lntotalpop	log of total population	1,759	12.051	1.714	3.479	15.037
lngrainyield	lognumber of *poods* of grain from a *desyatina*	1000	3.794	0.348	1.163	4.522
horses	horses per 100 persons	510	21.64	7.370	0	62
cows	cows per 100 persons	511	35.10	15.77	0	112

Table 2: Governors' Characteristics in Various Years

year	1895		1904		1914	
	Obs	Mean	Obs	Mean	Obs	Mean
age	80	53.01	82	52.27	80	51.84
tenure	86	5.73	89	4.85	90	4.09
court	86	0.26	89	0.33	90	0.29
centralapp	79	0.15	78	0.23	69	0.26
rank	85	3.6	89	3.78	89	3.92
title	86	0.14	89	0.12	90	0.13
educ	75	0.64	72	0.64	71	0.58
herednobility	80	0.99	80	0.98	68	0.99
religion	85	0.04	87	0.069	84	0.071
military	85	0.38	89	0.38	90	0.21
formermilitary	74	0.09	75	0.15	73	0.25

Table 3: Coding of Governors' Appointments

-1	retirement
	at the disposal of the Chief of General Staff
	attached to the General Staff
	division commander
	member of the Military Council
	attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs
	vice-governor
	honorary guardian of the Guardian Council of Empress Maria's institutions
	tried in court and (optionally) sentenced to prison
	aide of the commander of a military district
	at the disposal of the Minister of War
	founded the Community of the Sisters of Mercy of the Red Cross
	attached to the troops of a military district
	honorary guardian and the steward of a prince's court
	aide of a governor-general
	chief representative of a regional Red Cross society
	chief of staff of a military corps
	lawyer
	divisional brigade commander
	head of the Nikolaev Maritime Academy
	member of the Board of Consultation of the Ministry of Justice
	member of the Council of the Minister of Internal Affairs
	surrendered to the enemy
0	died (in particular, was killed)
	military corps commander
	transferred as a governor or a military governor to another region
	resigned because of illness
	left office after being wounded
	joined the army on his own initiative
	temporary left the governorship but resumed it the next year
1	governor-general
	Chief of Logistics of an army
	chief of staff of a military district
	commander of an army
	commander of a military district
	director of a ministerial department
	head of a department of the General Staff
	deputy minister
	senator
	member of the State Council
	mayor of Saint-Petersburg
	minister

Table 4: Summary of promotions and demotions

	Promotions	%	Demotions	%	Same Level	%	Total
career	69	4.03	116	6.78	1527	89.19	1712

Table 5: Two-Way Fixed Effect Estimation

VARIABLES	(1) career	(2) career	(3) career	(4) career	(5) career	(6) career	(7) career	(8) career
log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0224	0.0104	0.0200	0.0150	0.00517	-0.00555	-0.000171	-0.00322
	(0.0232)	(0.0265)	(0.0277)	(0.0290)	(0.0242)	(0.0275)	(0.0291)	(0.0302)
court*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.000672	0.00741	0.00945	0.0125	0.0258	0.0373	0.0368	0.0392
	(0.0237)	(0.0280)	(0.0287)	(0.0305)	(0.0255)	(0.0289)	(0.0305)	(0.0322)
centralapp*log(1+peasant revolts)		0.0163		-0.0159		0.00815		-0.0228
		(0.0318)		(0.0415)		(0.0327)		(0.0407)
oblast*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.141***	-0.151***	-0.157***	-0.157***	-0.159*	-0.152*	-0.170*	-0.165*
	(0.0486)	(0.0479)	(0.0512)	(0.0515)	(0.0834)	(0.0807)	(0.0876)	(0.0884)
govgen*log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0406	0.0367	0.0538*	0.0668*	-0.0149	-0.0196	-0.00893	0.00604
	(0.0282)	(0.0345)	(0.0319)	(0.0337)	(0.0327)	(0.0391)	(0.0429)	(0.0449)
1906-1914 dummy*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.00116	0.0182	-0.000001	0.00912	0.00201	0.0193	0.0101	0.0190
	(0.0212)	(0.0240)	(0.0242)	(0.0251)	(0.0204)	(0.0247)	(0.0250)	(0.0268)
log(1+worker strikes)					0.0417**	0.0456*	0.0473*	0.0488*
					(0.0200)	(0.0240)	(0.0237)	(0.0262)
court*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0319*	-0.0450**	-0.0558**	-0.0557**
					(0.0183)	(0.0207)	(0.0223)	(0.0227)
centralapp*log(1+worker strikes)						-0.00607		-0.00477
						(0.0228)		(0.0270)
oblast*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.148**	-0.148**	-0.183***	-0.175***
					(0.0699)	(0.0711)	(0.0461)	(0.0462)
govgen*log(1+worker strikes)					0.0364	0.0568**	0.0551**	0.0532*
					(0.0230)	(0.0265)	(0.0272)	(0.0292)
1906-1914 dummy*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0202	-0.0219	-0.0217	-0.0206
					(0.0141)	(0.0181)	(0.0192)	(0.0225)
court	0.000352	-0.0184	-0.0161	-0.0261	0.0122	-0.00871	0.0134	-0.000264
	(0.0335)	(0.0443)	(0.0428)	(0.0494)	(0.0400)	(0.0525)	(0.0494)	(0.0578)
centralapp		-0.000867		0.00249		0.0195		0.0249
		(0.0348)		(0.0416)		(0.0581)		(0.0717)
other personal characteristics	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Observations	1,694	1,418	1,381	1,262	1,218	1,018	1,011	920
R-squared	0.090	0.103	0.114	0.122	0.100	0.116	0.139	0.149

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clusterized standard errors in parentheses.
All equations contain regional and time fixed effects and controls for total population and rural population.

38

Table 6: Two-Way Fixed Effect Estimation (Controlling for Grain Yield Growth, 50 European *gubernias*)

VARIABLES	(1) career	(2) career	(3) career	(4) career	(5) career	(6) career	(7) career	(8) career
log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0280	0.0225	0.0309	0.0259	0.0210	0.0149	0.0150	0.0130
	(0.0283)	(0.0310)	(0.0324)	(0.0341)	(0.0272)	(0.0300)	(0.0313)	(0.0333)
court*log(1+peasant revolts)	0.000226	-0.000489	-0.00124	-0.00127	0.0198	0.0185	0.0293	0.0291
	(0.0270)	(0.0298)	(0.0328)	(0.0359)	(0.0262)	(0.0292)	(0.0307)	(0.0335)
centralapp*log(1+peasant revolts)		0.0256		0.00901		0.0174		-0.0128
		(0.0387)		(0.0507)		(0.0337)		(0.0430)
oblast*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.157***	-0.154***	-0.173***	-0.165***	-0.0316	-0.0360	-0.0507	-0.0447
	(0.0255)	(0.0288)	(0.0345)	(0.0367)	(0.0241)	(0.0269)	(0.0376)	(0.0415)
govgen*log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0103	0.0128	0.0765	0.0695	-0.0264	-0.0239	0.0436	0.0433
	(0.0567)	(0.0586)	(0.0507)	(0.0536)	(0.0573)	(0.0604)	(0.0807)	(0.0793)
1906-1914 dummy*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.00404	0.00396	-0.00355	0.00264	-0.000694	0.0103	0.00536	0.0134
	(0.0258)	(0.0296)	(0.0295)	(0.0317)	(0.0246)	(0.0285)	(0.0281)	(0.0304)
log(1+worker strikes)					0.0299	0.0313	0.0393	0.0351
					(0.0277)	(0.0320)	(0.0321)	(0.0366)
court*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0397	-0.0496*	-0.0566*	-0.0579*
					(0.0242)	(0.0276)	(0.0286)	(0.0298)
centralapp*log(1+worker strikes)						0.00975		0.0203
						(0.0351)		(0.0416)
oblast*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.220***	-0.222***	-0.228***	-0.220***
					(0.0209)	(0.0232)	(0.0310)	(0.0331)
govgen*log(1+worker strikes)					0.0829*	0.0904*	0.0796	0.0840
					(0.0476)	(0.0507)	(0.0518)	(0.0520)
1906-1914 dummy*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0144	-0.0141	-0.0138	-0.00930
					(0.0206)	(0.0251)	(0.0281)	(0.0329)
court	0.00759	0.000845	-0.0148	-0.0195	0.0355	0.0325	0.0165	0.00977
	(0.0441)	(0.0523)	(0.0532)	(0.0595)	(0.0487)	(0.0568)	(0.0604)	(0.0683)
centralapp		-0.0287		-0.0602		-0.0136		-0.0326
		(0.0515)		(0.0712)		(0.0681)		(0.0928)
Observations	957	841	812	747	908	799	770	710
R-squared	0.088	0.097	0.113	0.125	0.114	0.126	0.148	0.159

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Clusterized standard errors in parentheses. All equations contain regional and time fixed effects, controls for total population and rural population and the grain yield growth (first difference of logs of *poods* from *desyatina*) the same and the previous year.

39

Table 7: Comparison of Governors' Characteristics in *oblasts* and *gubernias*

year	*oblasts*		*gubernias*	
	Obs	Mean	Obs	Mean
age	335	54.39	1304	51.34
tenure	370	4.42	1400	4.8
court	371	0.01	1400	0.41
centralapp	322	0.18	1142	0.21
rank	368	3.40	1395	3.89
title	371	0.04	1400	0.17
educ	322	0.58	1136	0.66
herednobility	271	0.94	1273	0.99
religion	366	0.07	1353	0.08
military	370	0.87	1398	0.18
formermilitary	351	0.00	1133	0.21
career	356	-0.1	1356	-0.01
log(1+peasant revolts)	371	0.16	1400	0.9
log(1+worker strikes)	67	0.56	1197	1.23

Table 8: Two-Way Fixed Effect Estimation. Interactions with both *oblasts* and *military*.

VARIABLES	(1) career	(2) career	(3) career	(4) career	(5) career	(6) career	(7) career	(8) career
military	0.00511	0.0396	0.00855	0.0414	0.0601	0.0966	0.0594	0.0827
	(0.0419)	(0.0546)	(0.0509)	(0.0623)	(0.0645)	(0.0760)	(0.0702)	(0.0796)
log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0426*	0.0338	0.0462	0.0419	0.0242	0.0162	0.0221	0.0187
	(0.0243)	(0.0271)	(0.0294)	(0.0309)	(0.0243)	(0.0263)	(0.0294)	(0.0309)
oblast*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.111**	-0.114*	-0.124**	-0.121**	-0.123	-0.112	-0.137	-0.131
	(0.0532)	(0.0573)	(0.0584)	(0.0599)	(0.0886)	(0.0875)	(0.0927)	(0.0943)
military*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.0509	-0.0585	-0.0560	-0.0601	-0.0475	-0.0546	-0.0479	-0.0494
	(0.0387)	(0.0430)	(0.0411)	(0.0446)	(0.0396)	(0.0424)	(0.0405)	(0.0426)
log(1+worker strikes)					0.0570***	0.0660***	0.0755***	0.0759***
					(0.0199)	(0.0237)	(0.0267)	(0.0280)
oblast*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.131*	-0.132*	-0.156***	-0.152***
					(0.0715)	(0.0723)	(0.0474)	(0.0480)
military*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0302	-0.0353	-0.0512*	-0.0476
					(0.0239)	(0.0275)	(0.0273)	(0.0307)
Observations	1,693	1,417	1,381	1,262	1,217	1,017	1,011	920
R-squared	0.095	0.108	0.117	0.125	0.108	0.125	0.149	0.157

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Clusterized standard errors in parentheses.
All equations are the same as in Table 5, except for the inclusion of the interactions of peasant revolts and worker strikes with *military* dummies.

41

Table 9: Two-Way Fixed Effect Estimation. Interactions with *military* without *oblasts*.

VARIABLES	(1) career	(2) career	(3) career	(4) career	(5) career	(6) career	(7) career	(8) career
military	0.0215	0.0580	0.0281	0.0624	0.0882	0.124	0.0914	0.115
	(0.0413)	(0.0538)	(0.0499)	(0.0616)	(0.0641)	(0.0756)	(0.0719)	(0.0806)
log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0442*	0.0356	0.0488*	0.0445	0.0268	0.0182	0.0265	0.0223
	(0.0242)	(0.0270)	(0.0293)	(0.0309)	(0.0244)	(0.0265)	(0.0298)	(0.0311)
military*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.0684*	-0.0782*	-0.0757*	-0.0816*	-0.0630	-0.0695*	-0.0651*	-0.0677
	(0.0367)	(0.0399)	(0.0387)	(0.0420)	(0.0379)	(0.0403)	(0.0389)	(0.0414)
log(1+worker strikes)					0.0579***	0.0670***	0.0775***	0.0779***
					(0.0203)	(0.0238)	(0.0269)	(0.0282)
military*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.0402	-0.0455	-0.0615*	-0.0575*
					(0.0270)	(0.0303)	(0.0309)	(0.0339)
Observations	1,693	1,417	1,381	1,262	1,217	1,017	1,011	920
R-squared	0.092	0.105	0.113	0.121	0.098	0.116	0.137	0.145

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Clusterized standard errors in parentheses.

All equations are the same as in Table 5, except for the inclusion of the interactions of peasant revolts and worker strikes with *military* dummies, and exclusion of the *oblast* dummies and their interactions with revolts and strikes.

Table 10: Summary of promotions and demotions. Variable *career2*

	Promotions	%	Demotions	%	Same Level	%	Total
career	65	3.80	93	5.43	1554	90.77	1712

Table 11: Two-Way Fixed Effect Estimation. Dependent Variable *career2*

VARIABLES	(1) career2	(2) career2	(3) career2	(4) career2	(5) career2	(6) career2	(7) career2	(8) career2
log(1+peasant revolts)	0.0237	0.0154	0.0218	0.0202	0.0126	0.00775	0.0108	0.0116
	(0.0215)	(0.0243)	(0.0247)	(0.0261)	(0.0225)	(0.0251)	(0.0263)	(0.0276)
oblast*log(1+peasant revolts)	-0.116***	-0.126***	-0.132***	-0.134***	-0.113*	-0.110*	-0.126*	-0.126*
	(0.0440)	(0.0436)	(0.0464)	(0.0466)	(0.0625)	(0.0602)	(0.0694)	(0.0698)
log(1+worker strikes)					0.0367*	0.0402	0.0413*	0.0422
					(0.0205)	(0.0243)	(0.0241)	(0.0265)
oblast*log(1+worker strikes)					-0.153**	-0.154**	-0.191***	-0.184***
					(0.0681)	(0.0706)	(0.0400)	(0.0401)
Observations	1,694	1,418	1,381	1,262	1,218	1,018	1,011	920
R-squared	0.098	0.112	0.125	0.133	0.104	0.119	0.147	0.157

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Clusterized standard errors in parentheses.
Except for the dependent variable, the specification is the same as in Table 5