Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kiryl Khalmetski
Author-X-Name-First: Kiryl
Author-X-Name-Last: Khalmetski
Author-Email: kkhalmetski@nes.ru
Author-Workplace-Name: New Economic School
Author-Name: Mark T. Le Quement
Author-X-Name-First: Mark
Author-X-Name-Last: Le Quement
Author-Email: m.le-quement@uea.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name: School of Economics, University of East Anglia
Author-Name: Florian Hoffmann
Author-X-Name-First: Florian
Author-X-Name-Last: Hoffmann
Author-Email: florian.hoffmann@kuleuven.be
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business KU Leuven
Title:  Disliking to disagree: Implications of disagreement aversion for information disclosure
Abstract: We formalize the notion of belief homophily under asymmetric information by introducing a preference for perceived disagreement aversion. We study its implications for information sharing in a disclosure model where a privately informed sender and an uninformed receiver have heterogeneous priors, while the sender is averse to the receiver’s perceived disagreement. Equilibrium disclosure is partial and tends to confirm the prior mean of the more confident player. The receiver earns more from senders whose prior means differ more from his own but whose prior variances are more similar. Perceived disagreement aversion implies qualitatively reverse predictions than aversion to actual disagreement.
Length: 129 pages
Creation-Date:  2026-01
File-URL: https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP293.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Number: w0293
Classification-JEL: D81, D83, D91
Keywords: strategic disclosure, psychological games, disagreement aversion
Handle: RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0293