Positive Political Theory
A Political Model of Social Evolution (with Daron Acemoglu
and Georgy Egorov), Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Dynamics and Stability of Coalitions, Constitutions, and Clubs (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), American
Economic Review, forthcoming
Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships (with Georgy Egorov) Journal of European Economic Association, 9 (5), pages 903–930, October 2011.
Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives (with Paul Gregory and Philipp Shroeder), Journal of Comparative Economics, 39(1), 34-42, March 2011.
Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4), 1511-1575, November 2010.
Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (with Georgy Egorov and Sergei Guriev), American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, pp. 645-668, 2009.
Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule? (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 99(2),
298-303, May 2009.
The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession (with Georgy Egorov)
A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments (with Michael Schwarz), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2007
Coalition Formation in Political Games (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), Review of Economic Studies, 2008
Political Economics, Institutions, Russia
Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights (with Sergei Guriev), Journal of Public Economics, January 2009
Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (with Sergei Guriev and Anton Kolotilin) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27 (2), 301-323, August 2011.
Businessman Candidates (with Scott Gehlbach and Ekatherina Zhuravskaya), American Journal of Political Science, 54 (3), 718-736, July 2010.
Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, Journal of Comparative Economics, symposium issue on Appropriate Institutions for Growth (S.Djankov and A.Shleifer, guest editors), 31-4, 715-731, December 2003
Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya), Journal of Comparative Economics, symposium issue on Courts and Judges (P.Spiller, guest editor), 35-2, 253-442. June 2007
Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair (with Alexei Goriaev)
Provincial Protectionism, Journal of Comparative Economics, 38(2), 111-122, June 2010.
Passive Creditors (with Koen Schoors), International Finance, 8 (1), 57-86, March 2005.
Theory and Applied Theory
The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions (with Michael Schwarz)
Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (with Anna Mikoucheva), Economics Letters, 83 (3), 277-284, June 2004.
Collusive Market-sharing and Corruption in Procurement (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15, 4, 883-908, Winter 2006.
Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), 2009
