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CENTER for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions


Sergei Izmalkov / Сергей Измалков

BP Associate Professor of Economics 

Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University

CV

Research interests / Исследовательские интересы

Economic Theory, Mechanism Design

Courses taught at NES / Преподавание в РЭШ

Public Economics I, NES, 2008 – 2010,
Game Theory II, NES, 2009 – 2010,
Microeconomics III, NES, 2010,
Auction Theory, NES, 2010

Contacts / Контакты

Office #2.34, 100 Novaya Street
Skolkovo, Moscow, Russia, 143025
Phone: +7 (495) 956 95 08 ext. 134
E-mail: sizmalkov (at) nes.ru

Research: 

Publications

Perfect Implementation,
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali,
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming, 2011

On efficiency of the English Auction,
joint with Oleksii Birulin,
Journal of Economic Theory, accepted, 2010

Investor Sentiments,
joint with Muhamet Yildiz,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2(1), pp. 21-38,
Feb 2010

Verifiably Secure Devices,
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali,
in Proceedings of the 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, IACR,
March 2008

The theory of economic mechanisms (Nobel Prize in Economics, 2007), in Russian (not refereed),
joint with Konstantin Sonin and Maria Yudkevich,
in Voprosy Economiki, Vol. 1, pp. 4-26, January 2008
(Теория экономических механизмов (Нобелевская премия по
экономике 2007 г.), "Вопросы экономики", № 1, стр. 4-26, 2008)

Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design,
joint with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali,
in Proceedings of the 46th Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, IEEE, pp. 585-594, Oct 2005

 

Working papers

English Auctions with Reentry

Multi-unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction

Shill-bidding and Optimal Auctions

The Informed Seller Problem: the Case of Horizontal Differentiation, 
joint with Filippo Balestrieri

Games of Elimination,
joint with Dmitry Ilyinsky and Alexei Savvateev

A Model of an English Auction with Jump-Bidding

Pure Equilibria and the Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium,
joint with Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali, and Abhi Shelat

Transparent Computation and Correlated Equilibrium,
joint with Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali, and Abhi Shelat

Non-existence of Conventional (Partially Monotone) Equilibria in
Simultaneous Lowest-Bid Procurement Auctions,
joint with Elena Krasnokutskaya

A Model of Optimal Ticket Pricing with Heterogeneous Quality and Heterogeneous Customers,
joint with Johnatan Nauer

Informed Seller in an Hotelling market, joint with Filippo Balestrieri


Optimal Reserve Prices in Anonymous Asymmetric Auctions, joint with Valery Topinsky

Awards

NSF: SES-0551244
Title: “Cryptographic Game Theory”


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