Basic
Textbooks:
Drazen, A. Political
Economy and Macroeconomics. Princeton Univ. Press, 2000.
Persson, T.,
and G. Tabellini. Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy.
MIT Press, 2000.
Roland, G. Transition
and Economics. Politics, Markets, and Firms. MIT Press, 2000.
Additional
reading:
Atkinson A.,
and J. Stiglitz. Lectures on Public Economics. McGraw-Hill,
1980.
Alesina, A.,
and D. Rodrik. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1994, pp. 465-490.
Banks, J.S.,
and E. Hanusushek (Eds). Modern Political Economy. Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1995.
Bolton, P., and
G. Roland. The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1997, No. 4, pp. 1057-1090.
Brennan, J.,
and J. Buchanan. The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a
Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980.
Cooter, R.D.
The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State. In: Annual World
Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996. World Bank, 1997,
pp. 191-238.
Grossman, G.M.,
and E. Helpman. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review,
v. 84, 1994.
Dewatripont,
M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole. The Economics of Career Concerns, Part
II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies.
Review of Economic Studies, v. 66, 1999, pp. 199-217.
Eggertson, Th.
Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge Univ. Press,
1990.
Hart, O., A.
Shleifer, and R. Vishny. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and
Applications to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997,
No. 4, pp. 1127-1162.
Person, T., G.
Roland, and G. Tabellini. Separation of Power and Political Accountability.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, No. 4, pp. 1163-1202.
Persson, T.G.,
and G. Tabellini. Representative Democracy and Capital Taxation. Journal
of Public Economics, v. 55, No. 1, 1994.
Persson, T.G.,
and G. Tabellini. The Size and Scope of the Government: Comparative
Politics with Rational Politicians. European Economic Review, v.
43, 1999, pp. 699-735.
Phelps, E.S.
Political Economy: An Introductory Text. W.W. Norton, 1985.
Polishchuk, L.
Input Market Development, Property Rights, and Extra-Market Redistribution.
California Institute of Technology, 1996.
Polishchuk, L.
Political Economy of Scale and Endogenous Rule of Law. Mimeo, 2000.
Polishchuk, L.,
and A. Savvateev. Spontaneous Emergence of Property Rights: A Critical
Analysis. Paper presented at the conference “Transforming Government
in Transition Economies”, Moscow, 1997.
Qian, Y., and
G. Roland. Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American
Economic Review, 1998, pp. 1143-1162.
Shleifer, A.,
and R. W. Vishny. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1994, pp. 995-1025.
Tirole, J. The
Internal Organization of Government. Oxford Economic Papers, v.
46, 1994, p. 1-29.
Weimer D.L. (Ed.).
The Political Economy of Property Rights. Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997.
Weingast, B.
The Political Foundationd of Democracy and the Rule of Law. Mimeo,
1994.
Weingast, B.
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism
and Economic Growth. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
1995, v. 64, pp. 1-31.
