| NON-COOPERATIVE
GAMES IN ECONOMIC THEORY |
prof.
Alexander Vasin
Spring
2001
This course
aims to discuss applications of game theory to analysis of actual economic
problems. The course discusses the following main themes.
-
Models
of imperfect competition.
-
Evolutional
Game Theory and description of economic behavior.
-
Repeated
games and cooperative behavior.
-
Models
of tax inspection organization.
The proposed
course consists of 14 lectures and includes two control works. At
the end of the course there is a final written examination. Lectures
are supplied by corresponding methodical material.
The major
textbooks for independent work are:
[1] Danilov
V.I., Koshevoy G.A. Game Theory. The course for the first year students
of the NES.
[2] Myerson
R.B. Game theory. Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, London, England, 1991
[3] Moulin H.
Game theory with economic examples. 1985
[4] Mas-Colell
A., Whinston M., Green J.R., Microeconomic theory. 1995
COURSE
OUTLINE
1.
Introduction.
Problems of
imperfect competition theory. Bertrand and Cournot models. Basic
concepts of non-cooperative game theory. Models of adaptation and
imitation behavior.
[1] lectures
4,5,8
[2] chs 1,3
Milgrom
P., Roberts J. (1990), Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium
in games with strategic complementaries. Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277
2.
Oligopoly Models.
Bertrand-Edgeworth
model. Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Evaluation
of the market price deviation from the Walrasian price. Behavior
dynamics under price competition.
[1] lecture
6
Microeconomics-1,
Oligopoly
Allen B.,
Hellwig M.(1986), Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets,
Review of Economic Studies, 53, 175-204
Borgers T.(1992),
Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in Bertrand-Edgeworth
Model, Review of Economic Studies, 59, 163-176
Vasin A.A.(1992),
On Modelling of Collective Behavior in Social and Ecological Systems,
Moscow State University Computational Mathematics and Cybernatics
Bulletin, Vol.47,No.1,pp. 4-16
3.
Oligopoly Models (Continuation).
Model with quantity
and price leadership. Variable prices.
[3] ch 5
Friedman J.
(1988), On the Strategic Importance of Prices Versus Quantities,
Rand Journal of Economics, N4, 607-622
Dudey M. (1992),
Dynamic Edgeworth-Bertrand competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
N4, 1461-1477
4.
Introduction to Evolutional Game Theory.
Games of large
groups (populations) of agents. Evolutional principle of behavior
formation. Static and dynamic approaches. Random matching in pairs.
Vasin A.A. (1996),
On some problems of theory of collective behavior, OPiPM, vol. 3,
346-365
Maynard Smith
J. (1982), Evolution and The Theory of Games, ch. 13
-
Models
of collective behavior dynamics.
Replicator
dynamics. A notion of stable distribution over strategies. Relation
of attractors to Nash equilibria and dominant sets.
See lecture
2
-
Models
of adaptation and imitation behavior.
Monotone
dynamics. Generalization of the theorem on relation between attractors
and game principles of optimality. Problem of stability.
Vasin
A. (1999) On stability of mixed equilibria, Nonlinear Analysis 38,
793-802
- Evolutional
mechanisms selection.
Theorem on equilibrium
mechanisms. Pecularities of evolution of behavior in social populations.
On manipulation of collective behavior.
Vasin A. (1996)
8. Conditions
of perfect competition. Repeated bargaining in pairs as a mechanism
of equilibrium formation. Uncorrespondence between Subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) and Walrasian equilibrium in Rubinstein-Wolinsky model.
Rubinstein
A., Wolinsky A.(1985), Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential
Bargaining, Econometrica, 53, 1133-1150
9. The model
by D. Gale. The theorem on the correspondence between SPE and economical
equilibrium. Bargaining in pairs at the markets with two goods and the
finite time.
Gale D.(1986),
Bargaining and Competition Part 1: Charecterization, Econometrica,
54, 785-806
10. Does
repetition lead to cooperation? The Folk Theorem for dominant solution.
Construction of solution and pertubed payoff functions. The case of
outcome, which dominates Nash equilibrium of original game.
A.A.Vasin."The
Folk theorem for dominance solutions", International Journal of Game
Theory (1999) 28:15-24.
11. The model
of partner selection. Conditions of correspondence between the SPE and
the utilitarian outcome. Evolution of cooperative behavior. The case
of groups with unequal number of members.
Vasin (1992)
12. Determination
of optimal audit strategy for a direct tax. The theorem on optimality
of cut-off rule. Search for the optimal threshold.
Sanchez, I., Sobel,
J., 1993, Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies’,
Journal of Public Economics, 50, 345-69
A. Vasin, E. Panova,
1999, “Tax Collection and Corruption”, ERRC Working Paper Series
13. Models
with two levels of income and corruption. Agents’ behavior dependence
on audit strategy. Comparable statics of tax income with respect to
tax and fine rates.
A. Vasin, E.Panova,
1999
14. The problem
of tax inspectors stimulation. Optimal system of premiums for inspectors.
The optimization of net tax revenue in trasforming period.
P. Chander,
L. Wilde, 1992, “Corruption in tax administration”, Journal of Public
Economics, 49, 333-349
Mookherjee,
D. and Y. Png, (1989), Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 399-415
A. Vasin, E.
Panova, 1999
Prof.
Vasin A.A.,
Faculty
of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics,
Moscow
State University,
119899,
Moscow, Russia;
Tel./fax:
(095)939-24-91, e-mail: vasin@cs.msu.su
|
|
Contract
Theory
Corruption
Development
Economics*
Econometrics-1
Econometrics-2
Econometrics-3
Econometrics-4
(obligotary)
Economic
Statistics
Economics
of Transition
(elective)
Elements
of the Economics
of Transition*
English
Financial
Economics
Game
Theory
Growth
Theory*
Health
Economics*
History
of Economic
Thought (obligotary)
International
Finance*
Industrial
Organization-1*
Industrial
Organization-2*
Institutions
International
Trade*
Labor
Economics*
Macroeconomics-1
Macroeconomics-2
Macroeconomics-3
Macroeconomics-4
Macroeconomics-5
Macroeconomics-6
(obligotary)
Mathematical
Statistics
Mathematics
for Economists
Microeconomics-1
Microeconomics-2
Microeconomics-3
Microeconomics-4
Microeconomics-5
Microeconomics-6
(obligotary)
Natural
Resources
Non-Cooperative
Games
Open
Macroeconomics*
Political
Economy
Probability
Theory
Public
Economics-1*
Public
Economics-2*
Public
Finance*
Research
Seminar
Russia
in global environment:
past and present (rus)
|
