TOPICS in GAME THEORY

4th Module, 2002/2003

Professor: Grigory Kosenok, gkosenok@nes.ru

The course is dealing with some topics in repeated games. The special attention is devoted to the issue of cooperation among the players when they do not observe the actions of each other. The course includes 14 lectures. The final grade will be based on the midterm (50%) and final (50%) exams. Readings will mostly be taken from the list below. The copies of papers will be available in the library. Some papers are likely to be added or dropped as we go.

Refferences:

[1] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole “Game Theory”, MIT Press, 1996, Ch. 4,5

[2] Porter, R., Optimal Cartel Trigger-Price Strategies,”, JET, 29, 1983, 313-338

[3] Green, E. and Porter R., “Non cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica, 52, 1984, 87-100

[4] Abreu, D. and D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti, “Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring,” JET, 39, 1986, 251-269

[5] Abreu, D. and D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti, “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,” Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1041-1063

[6] Fudernberg, D., D. Levine and E. Maskin, “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,”, Econometrica, 62, 1994, 997-1040

[7] Kandori M., “Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,” JET, 102, 2002, 1-15

[8] Ely, J. and J. Valimaki, “A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” JET, 102, 2002, 84-105

[9] Mailath G., and S. Morris, “Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,” JET, 102, 2002, 189-228

[10] Compte O., “Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring,” Econometrica, 66, 1998, 597-626

[11] Kandori M. and Matsushima H., “Private observation, communication and collusion,” Econometrica, 66, 1998, 627-652

Plan of lectures:

1-4. Introduction to Repeated Games and Folk Theorems.

[1]

5-6. Cartel Equilibria as example of Imperfect Public Monitoring.

[2] - [4].

7. Midterm

8-10. Folk Theorems with Imperfect Public Monitoring

[5] - [6]

11-13. Folk Theorems with Imperfect Private Monitoring

[7] - [9]

14. Communication in Private Monitoring Games

[10] – [11]