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Antitrust
and Regulation |
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INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION II
Professor: Grigory Kosenok Info: The course is dealing with an empirical analysis of IO. This includes
14 lectures and 6 seminars. The final grade will be based on the final
exam. The knowledge of Theoretical IO and Applied Econometrics is
preferred but is not required. Readings: Readings will mostly be taken from the list below. The copies
of papers will be available in the library. Some papers are likely
to be added or dropped as we go.
1. Oligopoly empirics Bresnahan (1989) “Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power” in
R. Schmalensee and R. Willing (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization,
ch.17 Borenstein, S. and A. Shepard (1996) “Dynamic pricing in Retail Gasoline
Markets,”, Rand Journal of Economics, 27, 429-451 Ellison, G. (1994) “Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive
Committee,” Rand Journal of Economics, 25, 37-57
2. Productivity and Costs
Christensen, L. and W. Greene (1976) “Economies of Scales in U.S. Electric
Power Generation,” Journal of Political Economy, 655-676 Olley, G. and A. Pakes (1996) “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications
Equipment Industry,” Econometrica, 64, 1263-1297 Evans, D. and J. Heckman (1984) “A test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function
with and Application to the Bell System,” American Economic Review,
9, 615-623
3. Differentiated Product Markets
Nevo (2001) “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat breakfast Cereal
Industry,” Econometrica, 69, 307-342 Berry (1994) “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 242-262
4. Price Discrimination
Aguirregabiria, V. (1999) “The Dynamics of Markups and Inventories in Retailing
Firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 275-308 Shepard A. (1991) “Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,” Journal
of Political Economy, Spring, 30-53 Goldberg, P. (1996) “Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases:
Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey,” Journal of Political
Economy, 104 (June): 622-654
5. Auctions Hendricks, K. and R. Porter (1988) “An Empirical Study of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information,” American Economic Review, 12, 865-883 Guerre, E., I. Perrigne and Q. Vuong (2000) “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation
of First-Price Auctions,” Econometrica, 68, 525-574 Li, T., I. Perrigne and Q. Vuong (2000) “Conditionally Independent Private
Information in OCS Wildcat Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 98,
129-161 Porter (1995) “The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease
Auctions,” Econometrica, 63, 1-28
6. Entry and Exit
Berry, S. (1992) “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry,”
Econometrica, 60, 889-917 Bresnahan, T. and P. Reiss (1990) “Entry in Monopoly Markets,” Review of
Economic Studies, 57, 531-553 Dunne, T., M. Roberts and L. Samuelson (1988) “Patterns of Firm Entry and
Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries,” Rand Journal of Economics,
19, 495-515
7. Contracts
Chiappori, P. and B. Salanie (2000) “Testing for Asymmetric Information
in Insurance Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78 Joskow, P. (1987) “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments:
Empirical,” American Economic Review 77(1): 168-185 |
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